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THE HYBRID CLASS ACTION AS JUDICIAL
SPORK: MANAGING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
IN A STEW OF COMMON WRONG
JON ROMBERG*

INTRODUCTION

The federal courts are increasingly bedeviled by a set of cases
that seem to warrant collective resolution, yet do not fit easily into
any of the class action categories of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b).
In these "mixed cases," a class of people
challenges a defendant's ongoing practice that is alleged to cause
-

and to have caused -

harm to the class. The suit thus seeks

both class-wide injunctive relief and damages that vary among
class members.
Ordinarily, cases asserting that the defendant's coherent,
class-directed conduct warrants injunctive relief are paradigmatic
for certification under Rule 23(b)(2), a structure for naturally
cohesive classes that does not permit class members to opt out of
the suit. In contrast, cases in which the defendant's challenged
conduct has ceased and class members seek damages in
compensation for the individual harm they have suffered are
conventionally certified under Rule 23(b)(3), a less cohesive
structure requiring that notice be provided and opt-out rights be
granted. The federal courts of appeals and commentators are split
as to how to manage these mixed cases containing not only
common core issues going to injunctive relief, but also individual
issues going to damages that radiate out from that core.
The federal courts of appeals have split into two main camps,
clustered around two leading employment discrimination cases:
the Second Circuit's decision in Robinson v. Metro-North
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Commuter Railroad Co.,' and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Allison
v. Citgo Petroleum Co.2
Driving this split is a divergent
interpretation of the "predominance" criterion under Rule 23(b)(2),
which precludes certifying under (b)(2) an otherwise-eligible suit
seeking class-wide injunctive relief when the "final relief relates
exclusively or predominantly to money damages."'
The Robinson camp certifies mixed cases under (b)(2),
stretching (b)(2) a bit to accommodate a case that does not quite
fit. Robinson does this by addressing the common, injunctive
issues under (b)(2), then treating the damages stage of the case as
if it were certified under (b)(3), providing full notice and opt-out
rights after the common issues have been resolved. The Allison
camp, on the other hand, refuses to certify mixed cases under
(b)(2) when the class seeks any damages that vary among class
members. Allison holds that suits involving any variable damages
simply cannot be certified under (b)(2) because they are not
perfectly cohesive and thus do not quite fit the (b)(2) model.
The same set of concerns plays out not only in employment
discrimination cases, but in many other factual contexts in which
courts struggle with whether mixed cases can be certified under
23(b)(2), including consumer and securities fraud, product liability,
and some mass torts. For example, in Coleman v.GeneralMotors
Acceptance Corp.,' the plaintiffs alleged that GMAC was liable for
lending fraud because it allowed car dealers to tack on an
increased finance charge, above the rate at which GMAC was
actually willing to fund the loan, if the dealer thought it could get
away with it. These upcharges had a significant disparate impact
on African-American car buyers who financed through GMAC.
The gravamen of the suit was that GMAC's lending program,
which allowed and indeed encouraged the discriminatory
upcharge, was therefore liable to the class of African-American
borrowers whose loan rate was bumped up more than that of the
average white buyer. Plaintiffs sought uniform injunctive relief
enjoining continued operation of the program and continued
collection of the discriminatory upcharge fees, and sought what
could readily be thought of as restitutionary relief in the form of
disgorgement of unjust profit from previously collected
discriminatory fees. Nonetheless, the Coleman court followed
Allison in rejecting (b)(2) certification of the class, holding that
individual issues existed going to the extent of each class
member's upcharge, and thus the class could not be certified under
23(b)(2) because class members' interests were not sufficiently
1. 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).
2. 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) and FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's

note.
4. 296 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002).
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coherent to justify a mandatory (b)(2) class without notice and optout rights. If Coleman had followed the Robinson model, it would
have held that the class could be certified under (b)(2), but that
the (b)(2) class would be treated as if it were a (b)(3) class, with
notice and opt-out rights, when the court turned to issues
involving individual monetary relief.
This Article argues that these two leading approaches are
both mistaken: Robinson is too lax and Allison too procrustean.
The proper approach is neither the "yes" of Robinson nor the "no"
of Allison, but rather the baby bear's porridge approach of a hybrid
(b)(2)/(b)(3) class action. Mixed cases such as Robinson, Allison,
and Coleman should be certified under 23(b)(2) - but only as to
the first stage of the case, in which the common issues going to
injunctive relief are resolved. The second stage of the case, in
which individual issues going to damages are addressed, should be
certified under the broader (b)(3) category, which preserves
autonomy rights.
The hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) approach reformulates the mixed case
problem to expand the range of possible solutions in a manner
fully consistent with justice, Rule 23, and the Constitution. The
hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class action responds to society's interest in the
fair and efficient collective resolution of mixed cases - and with
absent class members' interest in protecting their autonomy.
The central insight of the hybrid class is that mixed cases are
composed of discrete bundles of distinct issues - and that courts
are specifically empowered to manage those issues flexibly under
the vitally important but "little used"' power to treat different
issues in a class action differently under Rule 23(c)(4)(A). Mixed
cases comprise an initial stage ("stage I") addressing common
issues relating to the propriety of class-wide injunctive relief, in
light of the defendant's general liability for its coherent, classdirected conduct. Mixed cases also comprise a subsequent stage
("stage II") addressing the individual issues necessary to
determine liability to particular class members, and the damages
award to which each class member is entitled.
Thus, a court need not determine whether it can shoe-horn
the entirety of a mixed case into a class certified solely under
(b)(2), or whether it must entirely abandon the (b)(2) paradigm
that is so useful for resolution of claims for class-wide injunctive
relief. Instead of an up-or-down decision as to a Rule 23(b)(2) class
action, courts considering mixed cases should assess the propriety
of the intermediate structure of the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class action.
Perhaps a visual model - oversimplified as it is - will help.
The (b)(2) class (fig. 1) can be thought of as a congruent whole,
with the (b)(3) class cluster (fig. 2) considerably more variegated.

5. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.17 (1995).
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Both the Robinson and Allison paradigms recognize that mixed
cases include a common, injunctive (b)(2) core - but with some
individual issues going to damages thrown into the mix, radiating
out from the edges of the (b)(2) core (fig. 3). Those individual
issues thereby render the mixed cases not quite able to fit into the
round (b)(2) hole, but considerably more coherent than the (b)(3)
cluster.

(b)(2) class

(b)(3) class

mixed case
(o iw

FIGURE 1

FIGURE 2

FIGURE 3

The hybrid model is predicated on the insight that the mixed
case is not actually a jumble of common and individual issues, as it
looks in figure 3 when viewed from the top (as in Robinson and
Allison). Instead, looked at from the side (fig. 4), the mixed case
bridges two distinct stages: the stage I set of common issues going
to the defendant's class-directed conduct that really is entirely
coherent, and the subsequent stage II issues that may be as
variable as a (b)(3) class.'
.

mixed case

(side view)
stage I

/

stage

FIGURE 4

The (b)(2)/(b)(3)
hybrid therefore
operates on the
understanding that the distinct stages in a mixed case can and
should be managed distinctly.
The hybrid applies (b)(2)
mechanisms to the common, injunctive portion of the case, stage I
(most notably, by limiting notice and precluding opt-out), and
6. Though beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting for clarity
that (b)(3) classes, when viewed from the side, are also composed of distinct
stages. There is an initial stage in which common issues going to the
defendant's liability are addressed, with a subsequent stage addressing
individual class members' entitlement to damages. Stage I (and sometimes
stage II) of a (b)(3) class is simply less cohesive than the corresponding stage
of a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class action, though sufficiently cohesive to satisfy
(b)(3) predominance and warrant class certification.
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applies individualized (b)(3) mechanisms to the varying damages
portions of the case, stage II, by providing full notice and opt-out
rights. The hybrid class thus functions as a judicial spork,7 if you
will, crafted to manage both the common stew and the individual
elements therein.
The hybrid class is not merely a more elegant way to describe
the Robinson approach to notice and opt-out so as to sidestep
Allison's cavils. There are two significant practical consequences
that arise from hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) certification of mixed cases: a
set of certification criteria that bear more resemblance to Allison
than to Robinson, and a scope of notice and opt-out that bears
more resemblance to Robinson than to Allison. Most obviously,
cases such as Robinson, Allison, and Coleman would have come
out differently, and far more sensibly: rather than a contorted
(b)(2) class, or no (b)(2) class at all, those cases - and a large and
increasingly important set of other mixed cases - would be
certified as (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrids.
The practical ramifications of hybrid certification come in two
distinct arenas.
First, the criteria for certifying a hybrid
(b)(2)/(b)(3) class must be established, consistent with the
requirements of (b)(2) and (b)(3), and of the logic, structure, and
language of Rule 23 generally. Second, the most salient advantage
of a hybrid class is that the scope of notice and opt-out rights for
absent class members need not be uniformly narrow (as in a (b)(2)
class action) or broad (as in a (b)(3) class action).
Instead,
individual autonomy rights will be relatively narrow in the
common, injunctive (b)(2) stage when the interest in collective
resolution is at its highest and the individual autonomy interest
quite low. Individual autonomy rights to notice and opt-out,
however, will be fully protected in the (b)(3) portion of the case,
when the issues concerning damages diverge among class
members, and autonomy interests begin to rise.
Though no court of appeals has yet affirmed certification of a
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid, there is a surprising amount of recent support
for use of some kind of hybrid certification from courts on both
sides of the (b)(2) predominance divide.
Even unexpected
proponents, such as Judge Frank Easterbrook, in Jefferson v.
Ingersoll International, Inc.,' have spoken approvingly of hybrid
(b)(2)/(b)(3) class actions:
Divided certification ... is worth consideration. It is possible to
certify the injunctive aspects of the suit under Rule 23(b)(2) and the
damages aspects under Rule 23(b)(3), achieving both consistent
7. "Spork: Blend of sp(oon sb. + f)ork sb. A proprietary name for a piece of
cutlery combining the features of a spoon, fork, (and sometimes, knife). 'Spork'
is the colloquial term for 'Runcible Spoon.'" Sporks, http://www.spork.org/
(last visited Nov. 25, 2005).
8. 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999).
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treatment of class-wide equitable relief and an opportunity for each
affected person to exercise control over the damages aspects. 9
Equally importantly, the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, and
the accompanying advisory committee notes, have recently placed
the hybrid class action on solid footing, grounding what may have
previously seemed an intriguing but perhaps chimerical thought
experiment. The notes direct that "[ilf a Rule 23(b)(3) class is
certified in conjunction with a (b)(2) class, the (c)(2)(B) notice
requirements [requiring full notice and opt-out rights] must be
satisfied as to the (b)(3) class."' ° The advisory committee has thus
given its imprimatur to hybrid certification that permits lesser
autonomy rights for the common, injunctive (b)(2) portion of a
hybrid class.
The moment for the hybrid Rule 23(b)(2)/(b)(3) class action
thus seems to be upon us. Yet, as the hybrid class action waits in
the wings, preparing to take center stage in contemporary complex
litigation, it has met with a fierce counter-attack from a prominent
commentator, Professor Linda Mullenix. Mullenix warns:
The Seventh Circuit's recognition and creation of the new "hybrid"
class in Jefferson seems to be one of the most insidious inroads on
clear thinking, let alone clear pleading. It is an open invitation to
game the system. The Jefferson option represents the ultimate
assault on distinct class action categories, and is a boon to lazy,
imprecise, or overly clever pleaders."
This Article hopes to provide a just-clever-enough response to
Professor Mullenix by applying some precise and clear thinking to
the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class. I agree with Professor Mullenix that
determining whether courts may resolve mixed cases through a
hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class is one of the most "truly pressing class
action issues" 2 that we face, and one that has been entirely underexamined, both in its theoretical underpinnings, and in the
specification of the exact scope of the constraints imposed by Rule
23 and the Constitution.
Professor Mullenix is correct that neither courts nor
commentators have provided a fully coherent explication of the
justification for, or, even more saliently, the implementation of, a
hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class action.
Nor have they adequately
grappled with the predominance criterion of Rule 23(b)(2).
Because mixed equitable and legal cases have a foot in both Rule
23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3), they provide a particularly useful

9. Id. at 898.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) advisory committee's note.
11. Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class Actions In The New
Millennium and the Blurring of CategoricalImperatives, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 177, 215 (2003).
12. Id. at 178.
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mechanism for determining the proper dividing line between those
two subdivisions of Rule 23(b) - a dividing line that, this Article
argues, actually spans the heretofore hazily explored zone of the
hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class.
Part I.A. of the Article introduces the basic criteria and
structure of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Parts I.B. and I.C.
focus on the 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) categories of class certification,
respectively, exploring the theoretical justification for each
category. Part I.D. then focuses on the theory underlying the
hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class, and how it operates to preserve the
benefits of both (b)(2) and (b)(3) class actions by applying them
selectively to the corresponding stages of a mixed case.
Part II canvasses the history of the hybrid class action. Part
II.A. discusses commentators' general support for some form of
hybrid class action in the decades following the 1966 enactment of
the modern version of Rule 23.
Part II.B. then discusses
developments in case law in the last decade or so, in which mixed
cases have become increasingly prominent, and the judicial
drumbeat of support for the hybrid class has correspondingly
crescendoed without, it must be noted, any parallel
development in explication of the hybrid class.
Part III then examines the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class in some
detail. Part III.A. specifies the criteria that must be satisfied to
warrant certification of a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class; here, the Article
maps out what has been an analytical wilderness. The first
necessary criterion for certification is that the proposed hybrid
(b)(2)/(b)(3) class meet the relatively simple test set forth in the
text of (b)(2): the class must present a legitimate request for classwide injunctive relief, based on the existence of defendant's
ongoing, class-directed conduct.
The next criterion - (b)(2) predominance - is the most
important, and the one that has driven judicial assessment of
mixed cases thus far. The first prong of the (b)(2) predominance
test examines whether there is a critical mass of common,
injunctive issues such that resolving those issues collectively
would materially advance resolution of the entire suit. A critical
mass of common, injunctive relief requires, at a minimum, that putting aside damages - the class would reasonably seek the
injunctive relief, and the court would find such relief to be
reasonably necessary and appropriate for class recovery. The
second part of the (b)(2) predominance test looks to whether there
is a critical mass of individual issues that precludes the proposed
scope of (b)(2) certification. That is, looking to the full set of issues
in the case, does the scope of the autonomy interests implicated by
the individual issues preclude denying full notice and opt-out
rights to all class members for the portion of the suit proposed to
be resolved under (b)(2)?
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A key element of the proper approach to (b)(2) predominance
is that the (b)(2) predominance test must be applied to the case as
a whole to determine if a pure (b)(2) class can be certified. Then, if
the entire case cannot be certified under (b)(2), the (b)(2)
predominance test must be applied to stage I of the case to
determine if that stage alone can be certified under (b)(2); if so, a
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid may be proper.
If the (b)(2) predominance test is satisfied (as to the entire
case, or as to stage I alone), the (b)(3) predominance test is
necessarily also satisfied, so there need not be any independent
application of (b)(3) predominance. This is because the (b)(2)
predominance test is parallel to, though narrower than, the (b)(3)
predominance test. This also means that if a case can be certified
under either 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3) - i.e., more than one category
along the increasingly broad spectrum of the pure (b)(2), hybrid
(b)(2)/(b)(3), and pure (b)(3) classes - certification should be
granted under the category providing the narrowest scope of notice
and opt-out.
Next, the role of (b)(3) superiority is addressed, which is to
determine whether cases in which stage I is properly certified
under (b)(2) should be certified as (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrids, i.e., are
such cases better resolved as a partial (b)(2) class limited to
common issues, or should the individual claims for damages be
certified under (b)(3) because hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) certification is
superior to a partial (b)(2) class.
Part III.B. discusses the role and scope of notice and opt-out
in the hybrid class. Full notice and opt-out rights must be
provided for any class (or portion thereof) certified under (b)(3).
For any class (or portion thereof) certified under (b)(2), the court
has discretion to provide appropriate notice, and has available a
broad range of measures to protect the autonomy interests of
absent class members, shy of full notice and opt-out.
Part IV of the Article recognizes that even if the (b)(2)/(b)(3)
hybrid is justified, both in theory and under Rule 23, it must still
pass constitutional muster. Part IV.A explains why Due Process
does not stand in the way of a properly structured hybrid
(b)(2)/(b)(3) class.
Part IV.B then explains why the ReExamination Clause and Trial by Jury Clause of the Seventh
Amendment also present no impediment.
Finally, Part V responds to recent, ardent criticism of the
hybrid (b)(2)(b)(3) class action. Professor Mullenix has written an
impassioned and detailed critique of the hybrid class. One of
Mullenix's central concerns is that judicial approval of the hybrid
class has been more in the form of vague support for an
amorphous notion than in the form of a precise, detailed
specification of the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid's certification requirements
and implementation structure. This Article, however, responds to
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that concern by specifying the precise contours of the (b)(2)/(b)(3)
hybrid. So specified, the hybrid class does not suffer from any of
the infirmities that Mullenix suggests, including her core
theoretical contention, that the discrete categories of 23(b)(2) and
23(b)(3) simply cannot be coherently conjoined into a viable hybrid.
I

CLASS ACTIONS UNDER RULE 23(B)

In order to better understand why the hybrid class action is so
useful, it is necessary to understand the justification for the (b)(2)
and the (b)(3) class action structures, and how each is so aptly
suited to resolving certain kinds of class action cases. There are
significant advantages to certification under both Rule 23(b)(3)
and 23(b)(2), depending on the context; the hybrid is well-suited to
preserving the advantages of each within a single suit by applying
(b)(2) to the (b)(2) stage of the suit and (b)(3) to the (b)(3) stage of
the suit.
Most notably, the hybrid permits the fair and efficient
collective resolution of issues going to common, injunctive relief
without requiring robust notice and opt-out rights that would
undermine that fairness and efficiency. Then, at the stage of the
suit when the presumption of class cohesivity breaks down
because of the existence of varying individual issues going to
damages, the full safeguards of obligatory notice and opt-out
protect the heightened autonomy rights of absent class members
at that stage.
It is crucial to recognize that the existence of those varying
individual issues at stage II of the case does not necessarily
implicate a sufficient enough autonomy interest at stage I of the
suit to require the full scope of notice and opt-out required of a
pure (b)(3) class action. Absent class members have a strong
interest in controlling adjudication of issues affecting their claims
when their interest in relation to those issues differs materially
from those of other class members; they do not have a strong
interest in controlling adjudication of issues that they share in
common with an entire, adequately represented class simply
because there are other issues in the suit that will come up later
as to which they do have a strong autonomy interest. Of course,
sometimes the divergence of class members' interests at stage II of
a case will be so significant as to undermine class cohesivity even
at stage I, thereby precluding a hybrid class. But that assessment
is built into the (b)(2) predominance criterion that is the primary
benchmark for the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class.
Rule 23 was amended in 1966 to its modern form, which
requires that a class seeking class certification satisfy each of the
four criteria of Rule 23(a), and fit into at least one of the categories
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of Rule 23(b) in order to be certified. 3 The four criteria mandated
under Rule 23(a) are numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation. 4 Subdivision (b) sets forth three
categories of class actions, one or more of which must be satisfied
for a class action to be certified.
A.

The Subdivisions of Rule 23(b)

Rule 23(b) establishes three categories of class action, two of
which are of direct relevance here." Subdivision (b)(2) applies
when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole." 6 It does not apply
when the "appropriate final relief relates exclusively or
predominantly to money damages.""
Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) of classes seeking variable
damages arising from a common wrong, though "not as clearly
called for" as the naturally cohesive (b)(2) class, "encompasses
those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of
13. "Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition" if
one of the three categories of subdivision (b) is satisfied. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) reads:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id. Analysis of these criteria is beyond the scope of this Article, because any
case that arguably warrants certification under Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3) readily
satisfies the 23(a) criteria (or fails to do so for reasons not relevant here).
15. The third category, subdivision (b)(1), applies in the following
situations:
the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications
with respect to individual members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). Class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) are largely beyond
the scope of this article. Though they share notable similarities with Rule
23(b)(2) classes because they are not subject to the obligatory notice and optout of Rule 23(b)(3), they are not so readily hybridized with Rule 23(b)(3) and to the extent that they are, the same general principles apply as under
23(b)(2).
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
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time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to
persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness
or bringing about other undesirable results." 8
Rule 23(b)(3)
employs two textual criteria, "predominance" and "superiority."
The subdivision is applicable when "the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." 9

Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) differ, not only as to the criteria for
certifying a class, but also as to the consequences for having done
so - whether class members must be afforded notice of the class
suit's existence, and whether they must be afforded the right to
opt out of the class suit if they so desire. Because the (b)(3) class is
not necessarily cohesive, the scope of notice and opt-out protecting
absent class members' autonomy interests is correspondingly
broad. "For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must
direct to class members the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort."'
Moreover, the notice
must explain that (b)(3) class members have an absolute right to
opt-out of the entire case, if they so desire."

18. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
The matters pertinent to the findings [of predominance and superiority]
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
Id.
20. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
21.
The notice [in an action under (b)(3)] must concisely and clearly state in
plain, easily understood language:
" the nature of the action,
" the definition of the class certified,
" the class claims, issues, or defenses,
" that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the
member so desires,
e that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests
exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded, and
• the binding effect of a class judgment on class members under Rule
23(c)(3).
Id. The 2003 revisions to Rule 23 explicitly grant the district court discretion
to permit opt-out at more than one stage of a case. Id.
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The scope of notice and opt-out is more variable for a (b)(2)
class action, but is in any event narrower than the obligatory
notice and opt-out under (b)(3). First, Rule 23 now states
explicitly that, as a matter of discretion, "the court may direct
appropriate notice to the [(b)(2)] class.""
As the advisory
committee notes to the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 explain, the
proper scope of notice and opt-out rights for a (b)(2) class may well
be much narrower than that for a Rule 23(b)(3). class (even when
the (b)(2) class is certified in conjunction with the (b)(3) class, a
practice the advisory committee notes expressly condones):
The authority to direct notice to class members in a (b)(1) or (b)(2)
class action should be exercised with care. For several reasons, there
may be less need for notice than in a (b)(3) class action. There is no
right to request exclusion from a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class.
The
characteristics of the class may reduce the need for formal notice.
The cost of providing notice, moreover, could easily cripple actions
that do not seek damages. The court may decide not to direct notice
after balancing the risk that notice costs may deter the pursuit of
class relief against the benefits of notice.22
B. The Theory of the Rule 23(b)(2) Class Action
There are important advantages to the (b)(2) class action that
make it undesirable in mixed cases to jettison (b)(2) entirely in
favor of a pure (b)(3) class. Members of a (b)(2) class are entitled
to a narrower scope of notice and opt-out rights than members of a
(b)(3) class because of the fairness and efficiency arising from
uniform resolution of a case that, in the main, seeks class-wide
injunctive relief. Unlike the inflexible requirements that a (b)(3)
class receive the best notice practicable (whether appropriate or
not) and receive the absolute right to opt-out, the court has
discretion with a (b)(2) class to provide the scope of notice and optout it determines best balances the collective and individual
interests in play. Indeed, the benefit of permitting a court to
narrow notice and opt-out rights when appropriate to do so meant
that, until quite recently, courts and commentators almost
universally asserted that if a class could be certified under either
(b)(2) or (b)(3), certification under (b)(2) was preferable, given the
paramount Rule 23 concerns of efficiency and fairness.24
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A). The advisory committee notes explicitly
recognize "the court's authority-already established in part by Rule
23(d)(2)-to direct notice of certification to a Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class....
Members of classes certified under Rules 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) have interests that
may deserve protection by notice." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) advisory
committee's note.
23. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2) advisory committee's note.

24. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 92-93 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(citing 7A CHARLES ALAN
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As to efficiency, the benefits of limiting notice and opt-out are
manifest.
Notice is expensive, and the additional litigation
brought by those who choose to opt out is inefficient. In a case
with no or limited opt-out rights, the parties and the judicial
system resolve a dispute in a single proceeding - albeit a complex
one - rather than through repeated litigation that, cumulatively,
consumes far more of society's and the parties' resources. The
efficiency of the (b)(2) class action is thus fairly plain.
Less obviously, fairness in many ways also counsels in favor
of the more limited notice and opt-out rights in a (b)(2) class even from the perspective of absent class members. First, as to
notice, the expense and difficulty of providing "the best notice
practicable" required under 23(c)(2) for (b)(3) classes can often
spell the death knell of a class action in which the expense of such
notice would require a large up-front expenditure by class
counsel.25 This barrier was erected by (or, depending on one's
perspective, recognized in) the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen
26
v.Carlisle & Jacquelin,
which held that personal notice must be
provided to absent (b)(3) class members whenever it is possible to
do so. This obligation applies even when it does not make sense to
so require from the perspective of the absent class members
themselves, i.e., in circumstances in which the cost of such notice
will effectively preclude the case from being prosecuted as a class
action at all.
The up-front expense of providing perfect notice under (b)(3)
can preclude socially beneficial litigation in two situations: first,
when the ratio of the cost of notice to the scope of damages makes
the game not worth the candle for class counsel (when the only
potential victory is a pyrrhic one, the battle is not worth fighting);
and, second, when the absolute size of the cost of notice is
sufficiently large that class counsel have difficulty fronting - or
even borrowing - that sum, regardless of the relative size of the
potential eventual payoff.27 Thus, a (b)(2) class can provide absent
PROCEDURE § 1772, at 425-26, § 1775, at 491-92 (2d ed. 1986); 3B JAMES WM.
MOORE ET. AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.31[31, at 23-236 (2d ed.

1996); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 728 (4th Cir. 1989); First Fed. of
Mich. v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989); Kyriazi v. W. Elec. Co., 647
F.2d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 1981); Laskey v. United Auto. Workers, 638 F.2d 954,
956 (6th Cir. 1981); Reynolds v. Nat'l Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 284 (8th
Cir. 1978); Robertson v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 556 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir.
1977)). But see Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 899 ("Ortiz... says in no uncertain
terms that class members' right to notice and an opportunity to opt out should
be preserved whenever possible.").
25. See 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 4:35 (4th ed. 2002) (highlighting the potential consequences of the
prohibitive cost of the notice requirement under 23(c)(2)).
26. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
27. This is particularly true in civil rights class actions, where class counsel
may be motivated as much by public interest goals as by a monetary outlay
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class members reasonable and adequate notice (not necessarily the
best practicable, but, e.g., likely to reach all class members, and
highly likely to reach any class member who cares enough about
his or her autonomy interest to realistically contemplate opting
out). Such imperfect notice under (b)(2) is preferable to a (b)(3)
class in which class members' theoretical autonomy interest in
receiving perfect notice effectively precludes a class suit and thus
precludes the opportunity to receive even imperfect compensation.
Next, and perhaps even more counter-intuitively, the right to
opt out can also undermine fairness.
Most obviously, the
defendant's interests are seriously undermined when class
members are permitted to opt out. For cases that are litigated, the
defendant's transaction costs from having to engage in repeated
litigation would eat up the defendant's assets to a far greater
extent than if all class members' claims were litigated in a single
proceeding. A very high percentage of class actions, if they are not
dismissed as a matter of law, are settled, 8 and in the settlement
context, defendants' interests go at least as strongly toward global
peace.
Global peace provides certainty, much desired by
stockholders, and allows the defendant to go about its business
without the shadow of uncertain future litigation and liability.
Furthermore, societal interests in allocating judicial resources
efficiently, and in seeking fairness through consistency of outcome,
also counsel in favor of limiting the number of times the same
common issues are resolved in multiple cases.
What, then, about absent class members' interests in opting
out, about which overwhelming fairness concerns have been
expressed? Absent class members' interests must be adequately
represented for collective resolution to be fair - but fairness does
not necessarily require opt-out. Counter-intuitively, in many ways
the absent class members are better off with mandatory
aggregation of their interests, without a right to opt out, given the
enormous collective action problem.' The class as a whole is, ex
ante, far better off if their interests are mandatorily aggregated
than if each is given the right to free ride, hold out from, or
otherwise attempt to extract a disproportionate share of the class
recovery (recovery that likely would not have been available but
that counsel considers to be an investment toward an ultimate recovery of
attorneys' fees that will more than compensate.
28. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997)
(citing THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER, & ROBERT NIEMIC, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITEE ON CIVIL
RULES 61-62 (1996)) (discussing the "'settlement only' class [that] has become
a stock device" in a "large number of cases").
29. See David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class
Actions: Cost Without Benefit 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 27-30 (2003)
(summarizing the collective action problem facing plaintiff classes).
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for the existence of the class). The latitude for each class member
to engage in this kind of gamesmanship eats up transaction costs
through these intra-class contests, thereby undermining the
class's overall recovery, and thus the potential recovery available
for each class member. The prospect is similar to that of a
prisoner's dilemma game in which each prisoner would gladly give
up the right to defect (i.e., to refuse to cooperate) in exchange for
similarly restricting his fellow prisoners.
A second indirect, but nonetheless important, advantage to
class members of mandatory coordination and cooperation is the
significant premium that defendants place on global peace, and
thus defendants' willingness to provide a significantly greater
overall settlement sum to the class when opt-out rights are
limited. Given this "global peace dividend," absent class members
will likely be harmed when opt-out is permitted and class
members are allowed to defect from a group that furthers their
0
common interests."
Even if the mandatory class might not be so
much better for the entire class as to be pareto optimal for every
class member - i.e., there may be some small subset of class
members who would have been better off defecting from a nonmandatory class and extracting a disproportionately large share of
a reduced overall sum - the interest in preserving the rights of
those would-be defectors is not deserving of protection.
Absent class members are thus in many ways best served by
limiting their ability to opt out (assuming, of course, that their
actual interests are aligned, as is required by the certification
criteria of a (b)(2) or hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class). Indeed, courts have
repeatedly recognized the
concern that under a flexible approach [providing broad opt-out
rights,] class members with individual monetary claims found to
merit additional procedural protection would routinely opt out of
class-wide settlements, and "defendants would not be inclined to
settle where the result would likely be a settlement applicable only
to class members with questionable claims, with those having
stronger claims opting out to pursue their individual claims
separately." Mindful that in the Title VII context as elsewhere
public policy favors settlement of claims, [courts] do not treat this
concern lightly.3
30. See Lesley Frieder Wolf, Evading Friendly Fire: Achieving Class
CertificationAfter the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1847, 1875

(2000) (stating that if "[niotice and opt-out rights would attach" to the liability
portion of a suit, "[clompanies may not offer equally desirable settlements
because they face the frightening possibility of an inordinate and
unpredictable number of separate suits."); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut,
You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds,
84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1500-06 (1998) (discussing holdouts and collective action

problem).
31. Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 95 (citations omitted) (quoting Kincade v. Gen.
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This is not merely a concern that judicial dockets will be
clogged if opt-out is allowed because defendants will not be
inclined to settle - a legitimate concern, certainly, but not one
that is sufficient to trump absent class members' autonomy rights.
Instead, it is a concern that permitting opt-out will result in a
collective action problem for class members such that they all (or
virtually all) will be made worse off if the class is permitted to
fracture, given the sharply differing incentive structure for
defendants if some class members defect. The exercise of opt-out
rights will clog the courts - a significant burden on society in
general and a source of potentially disparate and thus unfair
results, particularly in the injunctive context when defendants
might be ordered to behave differently toward members of a
similarly situated group; more to the point, it will also likely
significantly undermine the scope of class members' potential
recovery, both through the defendant's lessened willingness to pay
for only partial peace, and through what will undoubtedly be the
greater costs the plaintiffs incur in the aggregate to litigate their
claims. Indeed, even the Supreme Court opinion in Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp. - perhaps the high water mark for concern
about class members' autonomy interests - speaks uncritically
(albeit in passing) of the idea that "certifying a mandatory class"
seeking damages might be legitimate in certain circumstances:
[Some members of the putative class might attempt to maintain
costly individual actions in the hope and, perhaps, the belief that
their claims are more meritorious than the claims of other class
members,"... thus warranting mandatory class certification "to
prevent claimants with such motivations from unfairly diminishing
the eventual recovery of other class members.32
There is a concern that class members who choose to opt out
will "free ride" on the class portion of the case, hoping to engage in
a back-door route to "one-way intervention" through the offensive
use of issue preclusion against the defendant if the class is

Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 507 (5th Cir. 1981)). Accord Holmes v. Cont'l
Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1153 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming that sound public
policy directs that class members need not be provided an option to opt out in
a Rule 23(b)(2) class action); Stewart v. Rubin, 948 F. Supp. 1077, 1092-93
(D.D.C. 1996) (verifying that the policy against providing class members an
option to opt out flows from the concern that defendants would be unlikely to
settle when class members with stronger claims have been permitted to opt

out).
32. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 n.35 (1999) (quoting In re
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Drexel Burnham was certified under 23(b)(1)(B) as a mandatory class because,
in the absence of a class proceeding - or in the presence of a class permitting
opt-out - class members' ability to protect their own interests would be
impaired.
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successful." There is no legitimate interest in securing a right to
opt out for this reason, i.e., to game the system and in the process
undermine the legitimate collective interest in recovery of the
class as a whole.' There is a similar concern that counsel for
individual class members who opt out will free ride on the
substantial investment of class counsel.35
Yet another concern, surfaced by a leading commentator,
Robert Bone, is that permitting notice and opt-out may result in
inordinate delay, and thus a "fair regard" for the vast majority of
class members who do not wish to opt out of a suit seeking
significant damages may warrant a mandatory class: "At least
when individual litigation creates a substantial risk that
deserving plaintiffs will receive less than minimally fair recovery
due to inordinately high delay costs, a general principle of fair
regard might support certification of even a mandatory class in
order to assure fair treatment of comparably situated persons."36
Similarly, class counsel, or more competent class counsel, or class
counsel more willing and able to expend substantial resources, are
more likely to be drawn to a suit in which class members do not
have full opt-out rights, and this attraction for class counsel
thereby benefits the class.37
Finally, David Rosenberg has employed economic principles to
argue that absent class members' autonomy interests deserve far

33. See, e.g., Steve Baughman, Note, Class Actions in the Asbestos Context:
Balancing the Due Process ConsiderationsImplicated by the Right to Opt Out,
70 TEX. L. REV. 211, 224 (1991) (discussing why many of plaintiffs' incentives
to pursue individual litigation do not warrant individual due process
consideration).
34. Id.
35. Id. Cf David Rosenberg, Mandatory-LitigationClass Action: The Only
Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARv. L. REV. 831, 859-60 (2002) (arguing in
favor of mandatory classes). Rosenberg suggests that efforts to aggregate
class members informally is doomed to fail because "free-rider problems
plague voluntary joint ventures," given that
[miuch of a lawyer's work product in litigation falls into the public
domain, often through court records and leaks from insiders, creating an
incentive for other attorneys who hold similar claims simply to exploit
that work product rather than to pay the full economic price of
developing or buying it.
Id.
36. Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action,
14 REV. LITIG. 79, 107 (1994). Cf David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class
as Partyand Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 957-58 (1998) (arguing for a
view of the class as an entity, and suggesting that this model may warrant
precluding or limiting opt-out rights, even in some circumstances currently
governed by Rule 23(b)(3)).
37. See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class
Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 369-70 (1999) (reasoning that parallel actions
undercut the incentive of lawyer-entrepreneurs to act as class counsel by
reducing the opportunity for a reasonable return on their investment).
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less respect than provided under current doctrine, and he has thus
repeatedly criticized the notice and opt-out dictated by Rule
23(b)(3). Rosenberg explains that his own writings
develop the argument for adjudicating mass tort cases collectively
by mandatory-litigation (no exit and no opt-out) class action rather
than by class action with an opportunity to opt out or by the
standard process of separate actions. The argument relies on the
normative premise that the law should promote individuals' wellbeing, that is, their welfare or utility. Consequently, the law should
seek to minimize the sum of accident costs - specifically, the total
costs of precautions against accident, unavoidable harm, riskbearing, and administration of the legal system.
In order to achieve those goals, Rosenberg argues, class
members should be restricted in their opt-out rights, given what
not only society generally but each class member would rationally
prefer - before he knew his own particular circumstances that
might induce him to wish to opt out: "Ex ante, everyone...
understands that for mass tort liability to achieve optimal
deterrence and insurance, individuals must act collectively; in
particular, they must pool their litigation resources and forgo
exploiting tort law to maximize personal wealth" by opting out of
the suit.39
Thus, the benefits of a non opt-out regime are
accentuated the more one understands the legal system as
directed to furthering society's interests in prospectively shaping
optimal behavior. Mandatory regimes also appear more attractive
the more one understands opt-out as punctiliously protecting a
class member's idiosyncratic wish to exclude himself from an
efficient, collective process to determine the existence and extent
of his harm, even though his individual interests would be
adequately represented in that collective process.
One need not be willing to go so far as Rosenberg to recognize
the significant downside of mandating notice and opt-out for the
entire scope of a mixed case. Certifying a case entirely under Rule
23(b)(3) - even for the cohesive stage I of the case - places undue
emphasis on the theoretical autonomy rights of absent class
members at the expense of society, of defendants, and of the strong
countervailing interests of the absent class members themselves in
actually receiving (even-imperfect) compensation.
C. The Theory of the Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action
In contrast to the (b)(2) class, the (b)(3) class does not focus
predominantly upon common issues going to the defendant's classdirected conduct. Instead, the focus is not only on common issues
going to liability, but also on significant individual issues
concerning each class member; those issues are necessary to

38. Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 831-32.
39. Id. at 832.
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resolve whether that class member has been harmed by the
defendant's wrongful conduct - and, if so, the extent of the harm
suffered, and thus of the damages warranted. The Rule 23(b)(3)
class action was an "adventuresome innovation" in the 1966
amendments to Rule 23, intended to reach cases that were not
covered by the previous categories of class action that existed prior
to 1966, but that nonetheless appeared to warrant collective
resolution.4 ° The advisory committee notes explain, that under
Rule 23(b)(3),
class-action treatment is not as clearly called for as [with
subdivisions (b)(1) or (b)(2)], but it may nevertheless be convenient
and desirable depending upon the particular facts. Subdivision
(b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of
decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.
Because the reach of Rule 23(b)(3) is broader than that of
(b)(2), so are the restrictions imposed. In order to certify a class
under (b)(3), the court must determine that common issues
predominate over individual issues and must determine that the
proposed class is superior to other potential means of resolving the
Moreover, the court must provide significantly
dispute.
heightened notice and opt-out rights to absent class members.42
Given the presence of variable individual issues, and the
possibility that there may not be a natural cohesion of interest
among class members throughout the suit, the autonomy interests
of absent class members warrant greater protection than in a
(b)(2) suit.' This heightened autonomy interest is manifested in
the form of the strict requirements of 23(c)(2), which imposes a
particularly robust form of obligatory notice and absolute opt-out
rights for (b)(3) classes.
As will be obvious to anyone who has read scholarly
commentary or case law in the last decade, despite the existence of
the advantages to the (b)(2) class detailed above, concern has
grown about mandatory class actions precluding opt-out when
individual monetary damages are asserted. The Supreme Court
flagged the issue a decade ago in Ticor Title Insurance Co. v.
Brown,44 in which the Court (without reaching the issue) suggested
"at least a substantial possibility" that "actions seeking monetary
damages... can be certified only under Rule 23(b)(3)." The
40. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note,
10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969)).
41. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1966).
42. See supra Part I.B.
43. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614-17.

44. 511 U.S. 117, 120-21 (1994) (per curiam) (dismissing certiorari as
improvidently granted).

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:231

Court's more recent decisions in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor,45 and Ortiz,46 have reinforced the importance of absent
class members' autonomy interest in controlling litigation that
seeks substantial damages.47 These cases reflect "the Court's
growing concerns regarding the certification of mandatory classes
when monetary damages are involved."'
The concern is that mandatory classes - i.e., classes under
Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) in which no right to opt out is granted - are
problematic, insofar as they seek substantial, varying monetary
damages, for at least two reasons.
First, the existence of
individualized damages warrants a greater degree of autonomy for
absent class members than when relief flows uniformly to the class
as a whole. Straightforwardly enough, the individual's interest in
controlling resolution of issues particular to his own personal
monetary recovery is heightened, whereas there is a
correspondingly weakened interest in the fairness and efficiency of
a uniform process of collective resolution.
Second, issues
concerning individual liability and the scope of individual damages
will vary among class members, thus presenting the possibility
that the class representatives and class counsel will not have the
proper incentives to litigate in the best interest of each of the
absent class members.
Moreover, these concerns about mandatory classes grow as
the size and variability of the alleged damages increase.49
Particular concern has been expressed about mandatory
settlement classes in which class counsel, defendants, and courts
all have incentives to enter into a global settlement that pays class
counsel handsomely, provides global peace to defendants, and
clears the judicial docket - all, potentially, at the expense of
absent class members who have insufficient knowledge or
opportunity to police the size of the settlement, or its
apportionment between the class and class counsel.5"

45. Amchem, 521 U.S. 591.
46. Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815.
47. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 805, 833 (1997) (stating that Amchem "reinforces the importance of at
least preserving the forms of individual participation - - most critically, a
meaningful right to opt out of class actions").
48. Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2003).
49. See, e.g., id. ("Wle have held that certain minimal procedural
safeguards, such as notice and the right to opt-out, must be provided to bind
absent class members when substantial monetary damages are involved."
(citing Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted by Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S.
117, 121 (1994) (per curiam)).
50. See, e.g., Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815 (counseling caution as to mandatory class
actions in the 23(b)(1) context); Amchem, 521 U.S. 591 (discussing concerns
about mandatory class actions in the settlement context).
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Thus, despite the factors favoring limited notice and opt-out,
as in a (b)(2) suit, as explained above, there are also legitimate
concerns pushing toward heightened notice and opt-out, as in a
(b)(3) suit, when monetary damages are significant and variable
enough that the cohesivity of class members' interests begins to
fracture."'
D. The Theory of the Hybrid (b)(2) /(b)(3) Class Action
The attentive reader will by now have spotted the means to
reconcile the apparently difficult choice between (b)(2) and (b)(3)
certification of a mixed case, given the compelling justifications for
each: put the peanut butter and the chocolate together into an
even more compelling hybrid. By applying Rule 23(b)(2) to the
common, injunctive stage of the suit, and Rule 23(b)(3) to the
resolution of issues going to individual damages, virtually all of
the advantages of the (b)(2) and (b)(3) class actions can be
preserved because those benefits are largely distinct to the
different stages of the suit.
A (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid operates by applying differing
mechanisms to those differing stages. In the (b)(2) portion, class
members have no right to opt out of stage I, the common,
injunctive, cohesive portion of the suit (though the court as a
matter of discretion may provide notice); for stage II, the
individual portions of the suit in which their interests begin to
materially diverge, each class member has the full panoply of
notice and opt-out protections under 23(b)(3) and (c)(2). Happily,
the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 apparently contemplate just such
a hybrid. The advisory committee notes to the 2003 amendments
now explain that "[i]f a Rule 23(b)(3) class is certified in
conjunction with a (b)(2) class, the (c)(2)(B) notice requirements
must be satisfied as to the (b)(3) class" - but not, a fortiori, to the
(b)(2) class, thus undermining any suggestion that if part of a class
is certified under (b)(3),52 opt-out rights must be provided
throughout the entire suit.
Objections might be lodged against the management of each
stage of this two-tiered hybrid. First, some, such as Professor
Rosenberg, might prefer certification of many mixed cases as pure
(b)(2) classes rather than as a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid that permits opt-

51. This is true, at the least, in the absence of a strong countervailing
interest. Cf Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 815 (discussing, and not implying any
disagreement with, Drexel Burnham). In Drexel Burnham, the court upheld
the district court's certification of a mandatory (b)(1)(B) class without opt-out,
notwithstanding the assertion of significant damages, because permitting
those who believed they had particularly meritorious claims to opt out might
"unfairly diminish[] the recovery" of other class members. Drexel Burnham,
960 F.2d at 292.
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) advisory committee's note.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:231

out as to the portions of the suit going to individual damages.
Whatever the wisdom of Rosenberg's suggestions as a policy
matter, those who peek out from behind the Rawlsian veil of
ignorance will recognize that his proposals are exceedingly
unlikely to carry the day as to amendment or judicial
interpretation of Rule 23, and thus can safely be set aside.'
Less radically, there is a significant amount of case law that
upholds pure (b)(2) certification of mixed cases. Some of these
cases jerry-rig under (b)(2) what is in operation functionally
equivalent to a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid by providing full notice and optout rights at stage II of the case, but some do not, accepting
certification of pure (b)(2) classes with little or no opt-out rights.54
Although such mandatory certification may well be plausible for
instances in which damages are relatively small and there is little
variability in issues going to individual liability, there is growing
appreciation over the last several years of the wisdom of providing
opt-out if - and, most notably, when - class members' interests
begin to materially diverge. Thus, for at least a broad range of
mixed cases, a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid is preferable to a pure (b)(2)
class with no opt-out rights because the hybrid better protects
absent class members' legitimate autonomy interests in litigating
their own individual issues at stage II. A hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) is
also preferable to a pure (b)(2) class with jerry-rigged hybrid optout rights because the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) accurately captures the
proper certification criteria.55
Second, some might prefer certification of mixed cases as pure
(b)(3) classes, contending that it is improper that class members
with significant damages claims are denied full opt-out rights even
in stage I, the common, injunctive portion of the suit. They would
argue that class members seeking substantial damages (or
recovery substantially different from other class members) are
necessarily entitled to full control over every issue in their suit, or
at least any issue that might foreclose or impair their eventual
recovery.
The advisory committee note authorizing a different scope of
notice for (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes certified in the same suit rebuts
this bright-line argument. Moreover, even the argument that
damage claimants will at least quite often require opt-out rights
throughout the suit is, on reflection, inaccurate. Unless a class
member's interest in resolution of the common, injunctive issues
53. Cf Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1554 (11th Cir. 1986)
(upholding hybrid class action certified entirely under Rule 23(b)(2) permitting
opt-out at stage II, but rejecting propriety of ever permitting opt-out as to the
initial, common stage of the litigation because doing so would unduly
undermine the efficiency and consistency of the result).
54. See infra Part II.B.
55. See infra Part III.A.
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materially diverges from that of the rest of the class, the class
member's interest in prevailing on those stage I issues is
adequately represented by the class. In order for the hybrid class
to be certified, of course, the requirements of 23(a), including
adequate representation, and of 23(b)(2) predominance, must have
been satisfied.
The mere fact that a class member with a substantial claim to
damages might be required to remain in a class that could
potentially lose on a threshold common issue does not deny him
any rights to which he is - or should be - entitled. If his
interests do not materially diverge from the class until stage II,
then an idiosyncratic wish to defect from the class at stage I is
trumped by the benefits of collective resolution of the common
issues going to the propriety of the defendant's class-directed
conduct.
At stage I, the interest in efficient, coherent resolution of an
ongoing class-wide problem, and in a defendant's avoiding being
subjected to inconsistent injunctive relief, is paramount, thus
justifying a mandatory (b)(2) class for the management of the
common, injunctive portion of the case. In some mixed cases, of
course, class members' interests will diverge so much at stage II
that their interests cannot be said to be sufficiently coherent to
satisfy (b)(2) predominance, even for the common, injunctive issues
in stage I of the case. In such cases, a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid cannot
be certified and the class, if there is to be one, must be certified
under (b)(3). These cases, however, are relatively unusual.
In comparison to the (b)(3) class, the hybrid benefits not only
societal interests and the plaintiff class, but also defendants.
Although the defendant in a hybrid class action does not
necessarily get the complete global peace through litigation (or,
more realistically, settlement) of a single case as in a (b)(2) class,
the defendant retains much of the benefits of a fully mandatory
class. In many circumstances, if the defendant wins at stage I of
the hybrid case, the entire class action disappears, without costly
satellite litigation. Even if the defendant's victory at stage I does
not end the case - e.g., because individual claims could prevail
even if no pattern or practice of class-directed unlawful conduct
existed - the number and scope of likely individual claims is
sharply constrained.
Moreover, settlement of a hybrid class with a mandatory
stage I is, as a practical matter, likely to result in what is at least
very nearly global peace. Settlement of a hybrid class requires
"back-end" notice and opt-out for class members to review the
ultimate terms of the settlement, because it includes waiver of the
further right to seek damages. The number of opt-outs, however,
is likely to be relatively low for a settlement that is actually
adequate to induce class members to remain in the class. Thus,
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for many mixed cases in which class cohesivity is present in stage
I but not in stage II, both plaintiffs' and defendants' legitimate
interests are better protected in a hybrid suit than in a (b)(2) or
(b)(3) suit alone.
As explained further in Part III.A.2., there is a deep split
among courts and commentators about the propriety of a pure
(b)(2) case that seeks substantial damages. Doubters contend that
there is necessarily a breakdown in the cohesiveness of a (b)(2)
class when any non-incidental damages come into play, thus
precluding (b)(2) certification; believers suggest that significant
damages may be recovered in a pure (b)(2) case so long as the
common, injunctive relief sought is relatively more important than
the damages. Whatever one's position is in the debate as to the
proper criteria for a pure (b)(2) class for mixed cases, the hybrid
class sidesteps the problem almost entirely. Precisely when the
presumptive cohesiveness of the (b)(2) class breaks down wherever one draws that line - the class can no longer be
certified under (b)(2), and instead must comply with the
heightened requirements protecting autonomy under Rule
23(b)(3).
The discussion above has focused on the advantages of a
hybrid opt-out structure, explaining why providing opt-out in
stage I of a mixed case or denying opt-out in stage II is
problematic, and why the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid is the baby bear's
There are
porridge of class action management structures.
parallel advantages for the hybrid class as to notice. The difficulty
with notice in a pure (b)(3) suit is that Eisen requires the best
notice practicable, which, as explained above, may actually impair
The existence of the hybrid class
class members' interests.
mitigates much of the perceived burden of Eisen: in a world in
which every class claim to damages requires pure (b)(3)
certification, Eisen is a formidable obstacle; in a world in which
many classes seeking damages are certified as hybrids, with
lessened notice obligation until damages are actually at issue, the
barrier is far less significant.
The advantages of notice in a hybrid class, as compared to a
pure (b)(2) suit, present the flip side concerns. Members of a pure
(b)(2) class may not receive adequate notice of the class proceeding
to be able to protect their autonomy interests that do exist (shy of
opt-out) concerning the individual issues in the suit in which their
interests are not in fact cohesive. Members of a pure (b)(2) class in
a mixed case may thus be denied not only the opportunity to
litigate their individual entitlement to damages (given the absence
of opt-out rights), but also denied the notice necessary to contest
effectively the fairness of a settlement awarding and apportioning
damages. The hybrid often best resolves the notice conundrum in
a mixed case by (1) recognizing the district court's discretion to
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direct the proper extent of notice to the class prior to resolution of
the common, injunctive portion of the suit - thereby avoiding the
Eisen death knell by not necessarily requiring the best notice
practicable at stage I, and (2) requiring notice (including notice of
the right to opt out) prior to resolution of individual damages
(whether by litigation or by settlement).
Hybrid certification
requires notice - but only at stage II, when autonomy interests
are significant enough to warrant notice.
Moreover, the obligation to provide notice only after the
defendant's liability to the class has been determined has
important advantages. As Herbert Newberg explained:
Hybrid certification has the advantage of deferring notice and optout until a finding of liability has been made. Shifting the costs of
notification to the defendant may be possible at that stage, since
liability has been established. Thus, many suits may be feasible
that plaintiffs' attorneys would have found too cost-prohibitive to
bring under 23(b)(3) otherwise.5
Newberg's plausible suggestion is that the district courts
would have discretion, as a component of equitable relief, to
require defendants who have been found to have acted unlawfully
toward the class to pay some or all of the costs of providing the
class with notice of the right to seek damages. Settlement of a
hybrid case could build in the defendant's contribution to the costs
of notice.
Even apart from the defendants' monetary contribution, class
counsel would in any event have a much easier time securing a
loan to cover the cost of notice in a hybrid rather than in a (b)(3)
suit, given the finding of class-directed liability prior to the duty to
provide the best practicable notice. "Another advantage" to a
hybrid suit, explains Newberg, "is that injunctive and declaratory
relief may be available under 23(b)(2) in order to stop the
defendant's challenged practices immediately, before the issue of
damages is determined."57
Thus, hybrid class actions benefit the judicial system - and
therefore society generally - and benefit defendants by providing
an efficient mechanism to resolve large disputes, arriving at a

56. 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 25, § 4.14; See also George
Rutherglen, Better Late than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement
Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 275 (1996) (arguing that
plaintiffs are able, directly or indirectly, to shift the cost of notice to the
defendant if the plaintiff class is successful in demonstrating that the
defendant has engaged in ongoing harm to the class warranting injunctive
relief).
57. 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 25, § 4.14. See also Thomas R.
Grande, Innovative Class Action Techniques - the Use of Rule 23(b)(2) in
Consumer Class Actions, 14 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 251, 252 (2002)
(describing several advantages of various forms of hybrid class actions).
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(relatively) rapid and consistent result. Hybrid classes, less
obviously, also benefit absent class members. Resolution of stage I
of a mixed case under (b)(2) increases the size of the available pie
because it overcomes the collective action problem among plaintiff
class members and provides defendants with a far greater
incentive to put greater assets toward settlement. Resolution of
stage II under (b)(3) grants class members full autonomy in
proving the slice of that larger pie to which they are entitled. With
the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid, the plaintiff class need not halve its pie in
order to eat it, too.

II. THE HISTORY OF THE HYBRID CLASS ACTION
The idea of meshing the advantages of the (b)(2) and the (b)(3)
class action is not a new concept. Indeed, the hybrid class has
been lauded, in some form, by numerous courts and commentators
for many years. The key, though, is "in some form." Support for
the hybrid class has been quite wide, but the depth of analysis has
been exceedingly shallow, and the specification of the certification
criteria and the scope of notice and opt-out for a hybrid class
extraordinarily thin.
There has been, until recently, a fair amount of general
support for the notion of some kind of hybrid class action that is
neither strictly a (b)(2) nor strictly a (b)(3) class. Recently, as the
importance of mixed cases has become increasingly prominent,
there have been two reactions. First, several courts of appeals
have explicitly noted their openness to some form of hybrid class
action, though the form of these suggested hybrids has varied
widely between cases - and even within each case, these courts
have usually mentioned several different structures that a hybrid
class might take. Second, a smaller but far more direct backlash
has arisen expressing aversion to the hybrid class action, in large
part because the prior favorable assessments of the hybrid class
have been so hazy and amorphous, and because the (b)(2) and
(b)(3) classes are perceived to be so categorically distinct as to be
immiscible.
Part II canvasses the prior academic and judicial assessments
of hybrid class actions, hazy and amorphous though they may be.
Part III then explicates the nuts and bolts of the hybrid
(b)(2)/(b)(3) class, specifying criteria for certifying such a class, and
for managing a class so certified. Fortified with that detailed
specification, Part IV addresses constitutional concerns under the
Due Process Clause and the Seventh Amendment. Part V then
responds to the critics of the hybrid class - most notably,
Professor Mullenix - by rebutting the theoretical objections they
raise.
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A. Academic Assessment of the Hybrid Class Action
Prior to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, "hybrid" class
actions existed in name, but were an entirely different animal
from the hybrid class described here.' The "hybrid" class prior to
1966 was part of the complex taxonomy of class actions involving
so-called "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" classes, categories that
"in practice ... proved obscure and uncertain. " "
In 1966, Rule 23 was promulgated in its modern form.
Although Rule 23 and the advisory committee notes did not
explicitly endorse or repudiate the possibility of a hybrid class
action, in short order the three leading treatises uniformly spoke
approvingly of some form of hybrid class - albeit in passing and
rather breezily. Professors Wright and Miller argue in quite
general terms that when classes seeking injunctive relief also
assert claims for monetary damages, the injunctive claims can
proceed under (b)(2), and the monetary claims can often be
certified under (b)(3), with the court using Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to sever
such mixed cases into separate stages, and with each stage treated
according to the nature of the issues it encompasses.'
Professor Newberg similarly argues that when injunctive
relief is an integral part of the overall relief requested by a class,
the case should be certified under Rule 23(b)(2); if additional
claims for individual monetary damages are also asserted, he
explains, courts can employ at least four mechanisms to address
those individual issues, including deferred, partial, and hybrid
(b)(2)I(b)(3) certification.6 Similarly, the 1995 third edition of the
58. See Mullenix, supra note 11, at 181 ("The concept of the 'hybrid' class once a distinct analytical category under the original 1938 rule-now describes
various types of proposed class actions, and has assumed many meanings,
depending on the setting.").
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966) (citing, inter alia,
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 245-46, 256-57 (1950)).

Perhaps the long-standing existence of the term "hybrid class action" has
made the kind of (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid discussed in this article seem less of a
Frankenstein's monster to federal courts that are often wary of class action
innovation - but if so, that is merely a happy accident.
60.
[I]f the Rule 23(a) prerequisites have been met and injunctive or
declaratory relief has been requested, the action should be certified
under subdivision (b)(2) and those aspects of the case not falling within
Rule 23(b)(2) should be treated as incidental. As to handling the
litigation, it is recognized that the court has the power in appropriate
cases under subdivision (c)(4) to confine the class-action aspects of the
case to those issues pertaining to the injunction and to allow damage
issues to be tried separately.
7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1784.1 (3d ed. 2005). "In an appropriate case, various subclasses may be
governed by different parts of Rule 23(b)." Id.
61.
When the parties dispute which form of relief is predominant with
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Manual for Complex Litigation noted that "[t]he court may...
certify a (b)(3) class for certain claims, allowing class members to
opt out, while creating a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class for other claims, from
which opt-outs may not be permitted."62 Notably, none of these
suggestions provide any specifics about certification or
implementation of a hybrid class, in effect merely noting the
salutary possibility of hybrid opt-out.
More than 20 years ago, in the most focused take on the
hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class to date, Professor George Rutherglen
discussed several Title VII cases, treated as some form of hybrid in
the district courts, arising in the fifteen years following the 1966
amendments to Rule 23.' Rutherglen expressed support for the
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid:
Because Title VII class actions fit partially under subdivision (b)(2)
and partially under subdivision (b)(3), but not entirely under either,
courts should certify them as hybrid class actions under both.
Specifically, courts should certify claims for class-wide injunctive
relief under subdivision (b)(2) and claims for individual
compensatory relief under subdivision (b)(3).6

Rutherglen argued for a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) approach
generally similar to, but somewhat less attuned to autonomy
respect to the appropriateness of Rule 23(b)(2) for any class certification,
it is counterproductive for the court to expend time to try to resolve this
largely discretionary question, which does not address the merits of the
case. Rather, the court should conclude that when the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites are satisfied and declaratory or injunctive relief is sought
as an integral part of the relief for the class, then Rule 23(b)(2) is
applicable regardless of the presence or dominance of additional prayers
for damages relief for class members. With this approach, the court has
at least four options for class certification. First, under Rule 23(c)(4)(A),
the court could limit the Rule 23(b)(2) certification to certain issues only.
Second, the court could certify the injunction claims under Rule 23(b)(2)
and the damages claims under Rule 23(b)(3). Third, the court could
certify the entire class initially under Rule 23(b)(2), bifurcate the trial so
that the defendant's liability potentially for both forms of relief is
determined initially, and reconsider the class certification category if the
plaintiffs and the class are successful at the liability stage.
2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 25, § 4.14.
62. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 5, § 30.17.
63. George Rutherglen, Notice, Scope, and Preclusion in Title VII Class
Actions, 69 VA. L. REV. 11, 32 n.90 (1983) (citing Waldrip v. Motorola, Inc., 85
F.R.D. 349, 354 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Taylor v. Union Carbide Corp., 93 F.R.D. 1,
10 (S.D. W. Va. 1980); Greenspan v. Auto. Club, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 180, 182-83 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Branham v. Gen. Elec. Co., 63 F.R.D.
667, 670-71 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Bell v. Auto. Club, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1613, 1614 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Paddison v. Fid. Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695,
699 (E.D. Pa. 1973)); 3B MOORE ET AL., supra note 24, § 23.45[1], at 23-322 &
n.46; Robert S. Phifer, Note, The Class Action Device in Title VII Civil Suits,
28 S.C. L. REV. 639, 672-82 (1977); Thomas H. Barnard, Title VII Class
Actions: The "Recovery Stage", 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 526 (1975).
64. Rutherglen, supra note 63, at 30.
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concerns than, the form proposed in this Article. Rutherglen
argued that "class members could not opt out of the (b)(2)
subclass" because a strictly mandatory initial stage would best
maintain uniformity and efficiency, and protect defendants from
the burden of relitigating issues on which they had already
succeeded.65
Proposed revisions of Rule 23 in the 1980's and 1990's also
supported the notion of hybrid certification, pointing to the
significance of mixed cases and the difficulties attendant to shoehorning such cases into a single Rule 23(b) category.
The
American Bar Association's Section on Litigation issued the Report
and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Class Action
Improvements,66 which advocated eliminating the three distinct
categories under Rule 23(b), replacing them with a general
category for class actions, with certification dependent on a
superiority determination that considered a set of relevant
principles
drawing
from
(b)(1),
(b)(2),
and
(b)(3).17 A significant part of the Committee's rationale arose from
its recognition of the importance of mixed cases.
As the
Committee explained:
[The] three categories [of Rule 23(b)] are far from airtight and the
complexities of modern litigation doom to failure efforts to insist
that a given case must fit one, and only one, of the rule's
subdivisions. For example, cases involving claims for both money
damages and injunctive or declaratory relief present significant
difficulties of classification....

It may be appropriate in such [mixed] cases to permit class members
to exclude themselves from the action, especially at the stage in the
proceeding when individual relief is determined.6"

65. Id. at 30, 34.
66.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CLASS

ACTION IMPROVEMENTS, reprinted in 110 F.R.D. 195 (1986).

67. The Report stated:
We have concluded that the distinctions and procedural effects reflected
in the presently trifurcated rule tend to blur the core values of the class
action and to promote unnecessary, expensive and inefficient litigation
over peripheral issues. Our recommendations are designed to refocus
the certification inquiry upon the superiority of class action treatment
for the particular dispute, eliminate unnecessary expense and delay in
the maintenance and resolution of the action and facilitate attainment
of important purposes of the modern class action.
Id. at 198.
68. Id. at 197. See also id. at 207 (advisory committee commentary
subdivision (c)) (citing Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th
Cir. 1974) and Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F.2d 989, 993-94 (5th Cir.
1981)).
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The ABA Section on Litigation's proposal was never approved
by the full ABA, nor adopted by the advisory committee on civil
procedure.69 In 1996, however, the advisory committee did propose
revisions for Rule 23 that were largely consistent with the Section
on Litigation's prior proposal. °
These proposals were never
approved, given the lack of any consensus on which direction class
action reform should take; moreover, commentators were
understandably wary concerning the proposal to eliminate the
23(b) categories, because of the broad and quite unconstrained
discretion it would afford district court judges, and the
inconsistency that might well result, especially given the abuse of
discretion standard of review.
In particular, Professor Bone, a commentator generally
sympathetic to the hybrid class, suggested the need for
clarification of hybrid certification in his critique of the advisory
committee's proposed 1996 revisions to Rule 23.71 Bone argued,
quite reasonably, that if certification is to occur in some kind of
hybrid outside the standard categories of (b)(2) and (b)(3), it is
vital that there be careful specification of the certification criteria
and structure of such hybrid classes - specification that a
discretionary, gestalt standard did not and could not provide. This
sort of specification, however, has been missing from
commentators' analysis, and, as Point II.B., below, will
demonstrate, from case law. This Article is intended as a
corrective, crystallizing the general, hazy support for some form of
a hybrid into a carefully specified, pragmatically workable and
theoretically justified structure, by careful melding of the familiar
(b)(2) and (b)(3) categories.
B. JudicialAssessment of the Hybrid Class Action
Within the past several years, the hybrid class action has
grown to increasing prominence through almost uniformly
approving statements in quite a few otherwise-conflicting court of
appeals opinions. Some of these opinions accept and some reject
the propriety of certifying a mixed case entirely under Rule
23(b)(2), but virtually all are supportive of some form of hybrid
class, i.e., one melding rather than conforming to the traditional
notions of either (b)(2) or (b)(3). But, as with commentators, this
judicial approval is vague; it is almost always in the form of dicta,
69. See Bone, supra note 36, at 82 n.10 (noting that the ABA failed to
approve the proposal).
70. Cf Rutherglen, supra note 56, at 271 n.55 (stating that the revisions
dissolved the different categories found in subdivision (b) and replaced them
with more reliance on the district court's discretion); Bone, supra note 36, at
82 & n. 10 (discussing the Section of Litigation's proposal).
71. Bone, supra note 36, at 82-84, 96.
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it is usually casually supportive of many potential forms of hybrid
(without bothering to discuss the differences), and it is always
short on details specifying the certification criteria and the scope
of notice and opt-out.
A series of cases in the 1970's and 1980's in the Fifth and
successor Eleventh Circuits developed an approach to employment
discrimination cases that applied some aspects of hybrid
certification, though under a pure (b)(2) regime. This line of cases
held that the common, injunctive portion of the suits could be
certified without problem under (b)(2), but that the subsequent
stage of the case in which varying individual monetary relief was
sought - even though limited to the "equitable" form of backpay
- warranted greater protection of autonomy in the form of
expanded notice and opt-out rights."2
The structure the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits applied to these
mixed cases under a hybrid (b)(2) approach (generally, certifying
the case entirely under (b)(2), but permitting opt-out at stage II)
was inconsistent. The line of cases developed in a manner
seemingly more driven by the equities (or, more to the point,
inequities) of each particular case than by any overarching theory
of hybridizing mixed cases - or at least any theory deeper than
the observation that absent class members warranted the
protection of notice and opt-out at the stage of a case implicating
individual issues, especially when apportionment of settlement
proceeds seemed questionable.
The current ferment concerning class certification of mixed
cases was precipitated by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 ("CRA"). 73 The CRA was drafted with the intention of aiding
victims of discrimination by, among other things, expanding the
scope of available remedies to include not only the traditional
"equitable" remedy of monetary relief in the form of backpay
compensating plaintiffs for lost wages, but also to permit limited
recovery of actual and punitive damages.74
Ironically, this limited expansion of the scope of potential
remedies has in many courts resulted in a dramatic contraction in
the scope of actual relief.
This is because employment
discrimination cases that were previously certified as a matter of
course under Rule 23(b)(2) - because they encompassed only
72. See, e.g., Cox, 784 F.2d 1546; Holmes, 706 F.2d 1144; Penson, 634 F.2d
989; Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979); Pettway, 494
F.2d at 256-57; Bing v. Roadway Express, 485 F.2d 441, 447-49 (5th Cir.
1973).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2000). See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOuRTH) § 32.42 (2004) ("Class action certification of disparate treatment
claims under Rule 23(b) has become more complicated since the 1991

amendments to Title VII.").
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). Either party may demand a jury trial on those
monetary claims. § 1981a(c).
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injunctive relief and the "equitable" remedy of backpay - now also
include claims to varying individual damages. The common core
issues remain: is the employer's class-directed conduct unlawful,
thus warranting class-wide injunctive relief? But stray spokes
now radiate out; even if defendants' class-directed conduct was
unlawful, how, if at all, did that conduct harm each individual
class member? The presence of these individual issues going to
monetary damages now means that the cases cannot be slotted so
easily into the relatively coherent 23(b)(2) class action form.
After the CRA, two main camps have evolved. The Second
and Ninth Circuits in Robinson,75 and Molski v. Gleich,6 followed
an approach generally in line with the earlier Fifth and Eleventh
Circuit cases. That is, they upheld certification of mixed cases as
pure (b)(2) classes, requiring notice and opt-out at stage II, as if
that stage of the case were certified under (b)(3)."
The D.C. Circuit, also in this camp, though on the outskirts,
has been perhaps the most explicit and specific in its support of
the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class action - though, again, in dicta with two prominent decisions in Eubanks v. Billington,8 and
Thomas v. Albright." The D.C. Circuit's approach is particularly
interesting in that it begins with the traditional presumptive
certification of mixed employment discrimination claims under
(b)(2), but "conclude[s] that when a (b)(2) class seeks monetary as
well as injunctive or declaratory relief the district court may
exercise discretion in at least two ways.""
First, the court
explicitly approves of hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) certification:
The court may conclude that the assumption of cohesiveness for
purposes of injunctive relief that justifies certification as a (b)(2)
class is unjustified as to claims that individual class members may
have for monetary damages. In such a case, the court may adopt a
"hybrid" approach, certifying a (b)(2) class as to the claims for
declaratory or injunctive relief, and a (b)(3) class as to the claims for
monetary relief, effectively granting (b)(3) protections including the
right to opt out to class members at the monetary relief stage.

75. 267 F.3d 147.
76. 318 F.3d 937, 949 (9th Cir. 2003). Cf. Smith v. Univ. of Wash., Law
Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (foreshadowing Molski).
77. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 172. Cf. id. at 162 n.7 (quoting Professor
Newberg's and Conte's discussion of "four alternatives utilized by courts in
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions seeking injunctive relief coupled with individual
damage claims"). Molski largely tracked Robinson as to the propriety of a
(b)(2) class seeking non-incidental damages, also speaking approvingly in dicta
of three potential forms of hybrid class certification, including a (b)(2)/(b)(3)

hybrid.
78. 110 F.3d 87.
79. 139 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
80. Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 96.
81. Id. (citing Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1154-60; 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra
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Second, if the class is sufficiently cohesive at stage II so as not
to require a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class, but not so cohesive as to
permit pure (b)(2) certification across the board, the court upholds
the discretionary power of the district court to authorize opt-out
for unusually situated class members within a pure (b)(2) suit:
"Alternatively, the court may conclude that the claims of
particular class members are unique or sufficiently distinct from
the claims of the class as a whole, and that opt-outs should be
permitted on a selective basis [within the (b)(2) class] .82
Interestingly, despite the explicit approval of the (b)(2)/(b)(3)
hybrid, the holding in both D.C. Circuit cases actually resulted in
certification of a pure (b)(2) class without any opt-out, even though
both cases involved settlements involving fairly significant
monetary relief. The D.C. Circuit affirmed such a certification in
Eubanks,' and went so far as to reverse the district court's
authorization of selective opt-out in Thomas as an abuse of
discretion. '
The D.C. Circuit thus approves in principle of
(b)(2)I(b)(3) hybrid classes (if the entire class warrants opt-out at
stage II), or of selective opt-out in stage II (if a subset of class
members is unusually situated vis-a-vis the rest of the relatively
coherent class). In practice, though, it has squelched autonomy
rights even for settlements involving significant sums in the tens
of thousands per class member.
In contrast to these cases, the Fifth Circuit's current approach
is the most hostile to hybrid certification (though developments
after the Allison panel's original opinion make the Circuit's
approach significantly less antagonistic). The court's analysis of a
mixed employment discrimination case in Allison' is unreceptive
to both pure (b)(2) certification (with hybrid opt-out rights) and to
hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) certification.
Allison not only holds the
availability of any individually variable damages under Title VII
to preclude pure (b)(2) certification, but is also off-handedly
dismissive of the possibility of hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) certification.'
After a lengthy discussion ultimately rejecting the propriety
of a (b)(2) class, Allison opaquely rejects the possibility of a
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid in a three-paragraph section, with the only
reasoning being a four-sentence recitation of the district court's
note 25, § 4.14, at 4-51 to 4-52 (3d ed. 1992); Rutherglen, supra note 63, at 30).
82. Id. One interesting question, beyond the scope of this Article, is
whether this practice of "selective opt-out" for a small subset of unusually
settled members of a (b)(2) class should be available, in appropriate
circumstances, for stage I of a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid.
83. Id. at 91.
84. Thomas, 139 F.3d at 235. Thomas first held that Eubanks was not
affected by the intervening 1997 Supreme Court decision in Amchem, which
expressed general concerns about mandatory, non opt-out classes. Id. at 234.
85. Allison, 151 F.3d 402.
86. Id. at 418-19.
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conclusions about the viability of a (b)(3) class serving as the
apparent basis for rejecting the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid.
Allison
apparently follows the district court in holding that the same
individual issues that preclude common, injunctive relief from
predominating under (b)(2) also preclude common issues from
predominating under (b)(3). The court reasons that determination
of defendant Citgo's liability for damages could only occur through
assessment of each class member's individual circumstances, and
that this somehow precludes (b)(3) predominance of common
issues. The court also suggests that the many plaintiffs and many
issues in the suit would require multiple juries and would
implicate manageability, efficiency, and Seventh Amendment
concerns.8
Allison's marked skepticism about class certification of a
mixed case as a pure (b)(2) hybrid or a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid is not
technically the holding, as the majority in Allison explicitly
recognized in the statement it issued accompanying its denial of
rehearing:
The trial court utilized consolidation under rule 42 rather than class
certification under rule 23 to manage this case. We review that
decision for abuse of discretion and we find no abuse in this case.
We are not called upon to decide whether the district court would
have abused its discretion if it had elected to bifurcate liability
issues that are common to the class and to certify for class
determination those discreet [sic] liability issues.s9
Though cryptic, this statement suggests that Allison did not
definitively reject the propriety of a partial (b)(2) or hybrid
(b)(2)/(b)(3) class; indeed, this is exactly how the Seventh Circuit
interprets the statement. 9°
Another key development in the Fifth Circuit is the opinion of
a divided panel in the recent case of In re: Monumental Life
Insurance Co.9' Monumental Life, while technically consistent
with Allison, as a practical matter broadens Allison's approach by
approving certification of a pure (b)(2) class with hybrid opt-out
rights, notwithstanding significant monetary claims, so long as the
variability of individual damages does not turn on the subjective
87. Id. This section of the court's opinion, VI.A., may be intended as an
introduction to some or all of the court's subsequent analysis, but if so, that
analysis also focuses on (b)(3) certification rather than the analytically distinct
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid certification.
88. Id. at 419.
89. Id. at 434.

90. See Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 898 ("[Tjhe order [in Allison accompanying
the denial of rehearing] appears to suggest the possibility of a partial or split
class certification, just as we did above, so that a class under Rule 23(b)(2)
could seek injunctive relief while notice and opt-out rights were preserved for
damages issues.").
91. 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004).
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circumstances of each class member.92 This is effectively the pure
(b)(2) hybrid notice and opt-out structure of Robinson, though the
Fifth Circuit authorizes this structure through a different,
narrower set of certification criteria.93
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have followed the Fifth
Circuit's narrow approach in Allison as to the scope of a purely
Intriguingly, though, in
(b)(2) class that precludes opt-out.
contrast to Allison, those courts have repeatedly spoken
approvingly of hybrid certification in some form, beginning with
Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Jefferson - though, again, in
dicta, in passing, and in multiple potential forms (including a
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid).
After rejecting certification of a mixed case as a pure (b)(2)
class in Jefferson, Easterbrook ruminated:
Divided certification also is worth consideration. It is possible to
certify the injunctive aspects of the suit under Rule 23(b)(2) and the
damages aspects under Rule 23(b)(3), achieving both consistent
treatment of class-wide equitable relief and an opportunity for each
affected person to exercise control over the damages aspects....
Instead of divided certification - perhaps equivalently to it - the
judge could treat a Rule 23(b)(2) class as if it were under Rule
23(b)(3), giving notice and an opportunity to opt out on the authority
of Rule 23(d)(2).9
Since Jefferson, the Seventh Circuit has reiterated its explicit
support for the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid class, even going out of its way
to explain that such a class would not run afoul of the
Constitution.95
The Eleventh Circuit, in Murray v. Auslander,' similarly
embraced Allison's narrow approach to pure (b)(2) certification,
holding that a mixed case encompassing non-incidental monetary
damages could not proceed as a pure (b)(2) class. As in Jefferson,
though, the court approved of certifying the injunctive portions of
the claim under (b)(2), and directed the district court on remand to
consider whether the damages claims could be certified under
(b)(3) - a process that, taken together, would result in a hybrid
(b)(2)I(b)(3) class. 7 In addition to these court of appeals opinions, a
few district courts have actually certified hybrid classes.99
92. Id. at 416.
93. Id. at 417.
94. Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 898. Note that the second option would not, in
fact, be equivalent to the first, because if the (b)(2) class were treated as if it
were certified entirely under (b)(3), opt-out must be provided for all stages of

the litigation, not merely stage II.
95. See Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 216 F.3d 577, 581 (7th
Cir. 2000) (discussing divided certification).
96. 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001).
97. Id.
98. See Beck v. Boeing, 203 F.R.D. 459 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (granting
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In sum, there has recently been a great deal of support for the
general principle that mixed cases seeking both injunctive relief
and damages can and should be certifiable, in some form, under
some blend of 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). The courts of appeals have
expressed this support in dicta, briefly mentioning various
potential structures for such hybrid classes, sometimes under a
pure (b)(2) class, and sometimes under a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid. The
last decade has thus brought about a surprisingly general
consensus - woefully short on specifics, and often set forth in
dicta in footnotes - that some form of hybrid sounds like a good
idea. Part III is intended to crystallize that consensus into a
particular form of (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid that is fair, efficient, and
consistent with Rule 23 and the Constitution.
III. THE HYBRID (B)(2)/(B)(3) CLAss ACTION
Understanding how the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid fully complies with
both the theory and explicit criteria of Rule 23 requires working
through the elements necessary for certification of a (b)(2)/(b)(3)
hybrid class. Those elements are summarized as follows, and
explicated in the remainder of Part III:'
A. The Criteria for Certifying a Hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) Class Action
1. (b)(2) Text: The class must be seeking final injunctive or
declaratory relief that flows to the class as a whole, given the
defendant's ongoing, class-directed conduct;
2. (b)(2) Predominance:
a. There must be a critical mass of common issues
concerning the defendant's liability for injunctive relief
such that resolution of those common issues would
materially advance resolution of the entire lawsuit, and
such that the class would reasonably seek and the court
would reasonably award such class-wide relief, even in the
absence of damages;
b. There must not be a critical mass of individual issues
undermining class cohesivity for the portion of the case
sought to be certified under (b)(2), whether only the
certification for hybrid class), vacated in part by Beck v. Boeing, 60 Fed. Appx.
38 (9th Cir. 2003); Smith v. Texaco, 88 F. Supp. 2d 663 (E.D. Tex. 2000)
(certifying a hybrid class action), vacated by 281 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2002)
(vacating district court and panel opinion because parties settled while en
banc review was pending); Beckmann v. CBS, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 608 (D. Minn.
2000) (holding that a hybrid class certification should be granted); Diaz v.
Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth., 165 F.R.D. 689 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (concluding
that the certification of hybrid class was proper).
99. The criteria also address the elements of a properly certified pure (b)(2)
class in order to highlight the dividing line between a pure (b)(2) class and a

(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid.
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common, injunctive stage I of the case, or for both stage I
and the individual damages stage II of the case. In
particular, if the extent of individual issues going to
damages so undermines class cohesivity as to require that
full notice and opt-out rights be provided for every class
member:
i. at both stage I and stage II of the case, then the class
cannot be certified under (b)(2);
ii. at neither stage of the case, then the entire class can
be certified as a pure (b)(2);
iii. at stage II of the case, but not at stage I, then stage I
of the case may be certified under (b)(2) (and a
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid may be appropriate);
3. (b)(3) Predominance: This criterion is automatically
satisfied if the more exacting (b)(2) predominance criterion
has been satisfied.
4. (b)(3) Superiority: Assuming that the (b)(2) text and (b)(2)
predominance criteria have been satisfied, but only for stage
I of the suit, the court must determine, looking primarily to
manageability concerns, whether it would be superior to
certify a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid class, or instead a partial (b)(2)
class (in which issues going to common, injunctive relief
would be resolved, but the suit would not address individual
claims to damages and there is thus no stage II).
B. Notice and opt-out rights for (b)(2) portions of the suit: If a
court has certified some or all stages of the case under (b)(2), it
must decide the appropriate scope of notice and opt-out to provide
class members for those stages, shy of the full notice and opt-out
required under (b)(3).
A.

The Criteriafor Certifying a Hybrid (b)(2) ! (b)(3) Class Action

1.

The Text of 23(b)(2)

The first requirement that a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class must
satisfy is the threshold criterion set forth in the text of 23(b)(2):
"[Tihe party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole.""°
That is, the
defendant must be engaged in coherent, class-directed conduct
that - if unlawful - would warrant final, class-wide injunctive
relief. This requirement is relatively straightforward; the only

100. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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serious issue concerns classes that seek "corresponding declaratory
relief' in the nature of a declaration that the defendant is liable to
the class, without any further relief contemplated other than
recovery of damages that individual class members are able to
prove. As the advisory committee notes clarify, "[dieclaratory
relief 'corresponds' to injunctive relief when as a practical matter
it affords injunctive relief or serves as a basis for later injunctive
relief."'' Thus, any hybrid class action requires a legitimate,
ongoing dispute between the defendant and at least some class
members such that the suit, if successful, could provide class
members with meaningful injunctive relief - not merely a
declaration of liability to be followed by an attempt to recover
damages.'02
2. 23(b)(2) Predominance
The federal courts are deeply split on the meaning of Rule
23(b)(2) predominance, which is the criterion stated in the
advisory committee notes that a (b)(2) class action is improper
when "appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly
to money damages.""
The two leading cases are the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Allison,' which defines (b)(2) predominance
quite narrowly, and the Second Circuit's opinion in Robinson,'°5
which defines (b)(2) predominance relatively broadly.
For
different reasons, both of the leading cases are mistaken, though
both are also in significant part correct; the proper analysis,
appropriately enough, lies in a hybrid of the two approaches.
The (b)(2) predominance criterion is central to the (b)(2)/(b)(3)
hybrid. Recall that (b)(2) predominance comes not from the text of
Rule 23, but rather from the 1966 advisory committee notes, which

101. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
102. There are interesting issues at the border of what constitutes
meaningful injunctive relief, but those are beyond the scope of this Article.
These gray zone issues include: what percentage of the class, or what absolute
number of class members, must have an ongoing relationship with the
defendant such that injunctive relief directed to the class is meaningful?
When can a class, particularly within but not limited to the civil rights
context, encompass future members - those who will be subjected to the
defendant's ongoing practices in the future - such that an injunction against

the defendant will provide meaningful relief in that it will protect not only at
least one named representative (necessary for standing), but also future class
members (who may make the scope of the relief meaningful)? When should a
request for a declaration of liability, plus class-wide, or readily calculable,
disgorgement or restitution, be considered to be equitable relief? I have my
personal opinions about where to draw these lines, but the larger point is that
courts can and should make these determinations, and wherever the line is
drawn, an entirely justified hybrid (b)(2)/(bX3) class will result.
103. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.

104. 151 F.3d 402.
105. 267 F.3d 147.
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state that Rule 23(b)(2) "does not extend to cases in which the
appropriate final" relief
relates exclusively or predominantly to
money damages. 6' An argument superficially helpful to the
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid could be made that because (b)(2) predominance
is not stated in the text of Rule 23, it is therefore not binding, or at
least should be understood as less important and more flexible
than a criterion set forth in Rule 23 itself. The logic and policy
underlying Rule 23, however, cannot be understood coherently
without careful application of (b)(2) predominance - both in
assessing whether a pure (b)(2) class is properly certified (the
debate between Robinson and Allison), and, of direct relevance
here, in ensuring that a hybrid (b)(2)(b)(3) class is properly
certified. In order to understand how (b)(2) predominance should
be analyzed in the hybrid context, it is necessary to review the
proper measure of (b)(2) predominance in the context of a pure
(b)(2) class.
Allison speaks approvingly of the "[clommentators [who] have
taken the position that determining whether one form of relief
actually predominates in some quantifiable sense is a wasteful and
impossible task that should be avoided."' 7 Thus, quite wisely,
Allison's starting point in construing (b)(2) predominance is a
functional analysis of the reasons for and consequences of such a
finding, rather than an intuitive or dictionary understanding of
"predominance." 8 Allison first notes that "because of the group
nature of the harm alleged and the broad character of the relief
sought, the (b)(2) class is, by its very nature, assumed to be a
homogenous and cohesive group with few conflicting interests
among its members.""° Thus, unlike a (b)(3) class, in a (b)(2) class
there is no absolute right for absent class members to receive
notice of the suit, and no absolute right to opt out of the suit." 0
Allison then reaches an initial conclusion that is entirely apt:
"[M]onetary relief 'predominates' under Rule 23(b)(2) when its
presence in the litigation suggests that the procedural safeguards
of notice and opt-out are necessary. . . .""' In other words, the
class cannot be certified under (b)(2) when individual issues going
to damages are sufficiently weighty to require full notice and optout rights, i.e., when (b)(3) rather than (b)(2) is the proper route
for certification. This is precisely the proper approach.
Allison's next step, however, is by no means obvious. It holds
that the (b)(2) predominance line requiring full notice and opt-out
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
107. Allison, 151 F.3d at 412 (citing 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 24,
§ 1775; NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 25, § 4.14).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 413.
110. Id. at 412 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)).
111. Id. at 413.
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rights is crossed "when the monetary relief being sought is less of
a group remedy and instead depends more on the varying
circumstances and merits of each potential class member's case.""2
Thus, Allison holds, "monetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class
actions unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or
declaratory relief. By incidental, we mean damages that flow
directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming
the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief.""'
Allison thereby concludes that common, injunctive relief
predominates over monetary relief only when monetary relief is
"incidental" - i.e., when the class asserts no monetary claims
other than those following mechanically from the very fact of
liability. Allison thus effectively transmutes the assessment of
whether common injunctive issues or individual damages issues
predominate into an assessment of whether there are any
individual damages issues at all. Allison provides no basis for its
conclusion that when damages vary even minimally among class
members who share an overwhelmingly important interest in
injunctive relief the case cannot be certified in a pure (b)(2) class.
Whether Allison is correct on this issue is largely beyond the
scope of this Article because its rejection of a pure (b)(2) class,
whenever individual damages are sought, goes to the dividing line
between a pure (b)(2) class and a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid, and not to the
general viability and wisdom of the hybrid class. It bears noting,
however, that Allison's conclusion is not particularly convincing.
It would seem that a case with common, injunctive issues of
overwhelming importance and non-incidental, individually
variable damages of a few dollars - or likely even a few hundred
dollars, or perhaps even a few thousand dollars - could properly
be certified as a pure (b)(2) class with limited notice and opt-out
rights rather, even, than a hybrid class.
More saliently for present purposes, Allison provides no basis
for its apparent implicit conclusion that if an entire case cannot
proceed under (b)(2) because full notice and opt-out rights are
necessary at some point, then not even stage I of the case can be
certified under (b)(2). Allison thus errs in effectively requiring
that full notice and opt-out rights be provided at every
stage of any
4
suit in which such rights are required at any stage.1

112. Id.
113. Id. at 415 (citation omitted).
114. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have adopted Allison's narrow
interpretation of pure (b)(2) predominance. See Murray, 244 F.3d at 812
(ruling that because plaintiff class's damages claim predominated over its
injunctive claims, the damages should have been exempted from class
treatment); Lemon, 216 F.3d at 582 (remanding district court's ruling because
monetary relief was not incidental to equitable relief).
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In contrast, the Second Circuit in Robinson specifically
rejected Allison, holding that (b)(2) certification may be proper
even when non-incidental, individually variable damages are
sought, so long as the "positive weight or value" of the injunctive
relief is greater than that of the monetary relief."' The Robinson
court thus holds that the determination of (b)(2) predominance
requires an "ad hoc," context-specific determination of the relative
importance of injunctive and monetary relief sought by the class,
instructing the district court to consider whether "'the positive
weight or value [to the plaintiffs] of the injunctive or declaratory
relief sought is predominant even though compensatory or
punitive damages are also claimed."'""
This is precisely the
assessment of relative importance that Allison wisely rejects in
favor of a functional analysis that looks to the reason for
determining (b)(2) predominance.
The remainder of Robinson's predominance analysis,
however, is entirely proper, requiring that "class treatment would
be efficient and manageable, thereby achieving an appreciable
measure of judicial economy.""7 While not setting a bright line
cut-off for (b)(2) predominance (in contrast to Allison), Robinson
does set appropriate minimum criteria:
Although the assessment of whether injunctive or declaratory relief
predominates will require an ad hoc balancing that will vary from
case to case, before allowing (b)(2) certification a district court
should, at a minimum, satisfy itself of the following: (1) even in the
absence of a possible monetary recovery, reasonable plaintiffs would
bring the suit to obtain the injunctive or declaratory relief sought;
and (2) the injunctive or declaratory relief sought would be both
reasonably necessary and appropriate were the plaintiffs to succeed
on the merits.""
Thus, while Robinson's starting point is fundamentally flawed
- in that it requires weighing the relative subjective importance
of common, injunctive and individual damages relief - the
principles it states to guide that analysis are entirely apt.
Moreover, Robinson's adoption of the hybrid opt-out structure by
applying full notice and opt-out rights to a mixed case at stage II
of a pure (b)(2) class is functionally wise, even though its decision
to treat stage II of a pure (b)(2) class as if it were a (b)(3) class
(rather than actually certifying stage II under (b)(3)) is
analytically suspect.
The proper (b)(2) predominance requirement shares the
central framing element of the analysis in Allison, and many of the
115. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164-65 (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 430 (Dennis,
J., dissenting)).
116. Id. at 164 (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting)).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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other elements of the analysis in Robinson. Robinson accurately
captures the threshold notion of a critical mass of common,
injunctive relief, i.e., injunctive relief that would materially
advance the suit as a whole, that would be reasonable for a
plaintiff class to seek, and that would be reasonably necessary and
appropriate for a court to award, even in the absence of monetary
damages.
Robinson missteps in framing its analysis by requiring some
kind of unitary weighing of the common, injunctive relief versus
the variable individual claims for damages."9 In other words,
Robinson mandates a direct comparison, on some metric, between
the weight or value of the injunctive relief as opposed to the
monetary relief sought by the plaintiff class. The metric is not
clearly identified; it seems to be the subjective importance of the
relief to the plaintiff class - a measurement that seems both
impossibly mushy and manipulable, and, in any event, not the
appropriate standard.
As Allison properly recognized, "[tihe Advisory Committee
Notes make no effort to define or explain the concept [of
predominance].
Interpreting the term literally, predominant
means 'controlling, dominating, [or] prevailing.' But how that
translates into a workable formula for comparing different types of
remedies is not at all clear."2 °
Commentators have long
recognized that any attempt to measure (b)(2) or (b)(3)
predominance on any unitary scale is incoherent and useless - an
assessment adopted by Allison.12' Rather than a weighing of
common, injunctive versus individual damages issues a
119. Id. (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting)).
120. Allison, 151 F.3d at 411-12 (citations omitted).
121. Professors Newberg and Conte generally agree, though go further by

suggesting that courts ignore (b)(2) predominance in determining the
propriety of certifying a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class:
When the parties dispute which form of relief is predominant with
respect to the appropriateness of Rule 23(b)(2) for any class certification,
it is counterproductive for the court to expend time to try to resolve this
largely discretionary question, which does not address the merits of the
case. Rather, the court should conclude that when the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites are satisfied and declaratory or injunctive relief is sought
as an integral part of the relief for the class, then Rule 23(b)(2) is
applicable regardless of the presence or dominance of additional prayers
for damages relief for class members. With this approach, the court has
at least four options for class certification. First, under Rule 23(c)(4)(A),
the court could limit the Rule 23(b)(2) certification to certain issues only.
Second, the court could certify the injunction claims under Rule 23(b)(2)
and the damages claims under Rule 23(b)(3). Third, the court could
certify the entire class initially under Rule 23(b)(2), bifurcate the trial so
that the defendant's liability potentially for both forms of relief is
determined initially, and reconsider the class certification category if the
plaintiffs and the class are successful at the liability stage.
2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 25, § 4.14.
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misguided attempt to weigh incommensurables - the common
issues must be measured against the functional criteria
warranting (b)(2) resolution, and the individual issues must be
measured against the criteria precluding(b)(2) certification.
Thus, as the Fifth Circuit has recently clarified, "Allison did
not hold ... that monetary relief predominates where it is the
'prime goal' or a mere bootstrap to injunctive relief. Instead,
'determining whether one form of relief actually predominates in
some quantifiable sense is a wasteful and impossible task that
should be avoided.'' 22
Rather than attempt to define predominance in terms of some
comparison between the scope of injunctive relief and monetary
relief on some unitary scale, Allison requires the proper functional
analysis to determine when individual issues are of sufficient
significance to preclude certification of a pure (b)(2) class, because
class interests are sufficiently divergent to require the full notice
and opt-out rights of a (b)(3) class.2 3 Allison then appears to
misstep in its application of this framing construct, concluding
that, for a pure (b)(2) class, individual monetary relief
predominates whenever it is present, unless it is "capable of
computation by means of objective standards and not dependent in
any significant way on the intangible, subjective differences of
each class member's circumstances."" 4 As explained above, this
extremely narrow construction rejecting (b)(2) predominance in
the presence of any individual damages is in considerable tension
with the natural reading of "exclusively or predominantly to
money damages,"2 and thus not a particularly convincing place to
draw a bright line precluding (b)(2) certification.
Even more
fundamentally, though, the problem with Allison's approach is
that there is no functional justification for drawing any bright line
cut-off. As Robinson properly recognizes, the (b)(2) predominance
assessment can only plausibly be case-specific. Though Robinson
did itself no favors by characterizing its approach as "ad hoc," with
the consequent seat-of-the-pants connotation, it wisely insisted on
focusing on the particular common and individual issues in the
suit, rather than imposing an inflexible, acontextual bright line
rule that in every suit, any individual variability is too much.
The next key insight to (b)(2) predominance, which Allison
entirely misses and Robinson only hints at, is that the (b)(2)

122. Monumental Life, 365 F.3d at 415 (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 412)
(citing 7A WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 24, § 1775, at 470).
123. This is completely consonant with the Supreme Court's explication of
(b)(3) predominance in Amchem: "The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry
tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation." Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623.
124. Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
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predominance test must be applied to the stage or stages of the
case that plaintiffs seek to certify under (b)(2). Quite often,
plaintiffs will plead in the alternative, seeking to certify a pure
(b)(2) class, given the advantages of narrower notice and opt-out
rights - or, if the court finds the class insufficiently cohesive to be
certified entirely under (b)(2), plaintiffs will seek to certify a
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid. Thus, the court will determine if the scope of
individual issues going to damages so undermines class cohesivity
as to require that full notice and opt-out rights be provided to
every class member (1) at neither stage of the case, in which event
a pure (b)(2) class can be certified, (2) at both stages of the case, in
which event the case cannot proceed to any extent under (b)(2), or
(3) at stage II of the case, but those rights need not be provided at
the more cohesive stage I, in which event stage I may proceed
under (b)(2), thereby raising the possibility of a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid.
An example of a case in the first category, i.e., one warranting
certification under a pure (b)(2) class despite non-incidental
individual damages, might be a civil rights class action on behalf
of a few dozen inmates who have been housed for a few weeks on a
particular cell block alleged to be severely overcrowded. Such a
case might well involve compelling issues of injunctive relief, and
very modest damages (against prison officials in their individual
capacities), but those claims for damages might encompass some
non-trivial variability among class members (e.g., as to the length
of time on the cell block, and the particular deprivations suffered),
but be relatively congruent despite the subjective variability, with
the damages relatively small. In such circumstances, neither Rule
23 nor Due Process should require that every class member be
permitted to opt out of any portion of the suit. Class members'
autonomy interests in their individual issues of damages can be
entirely adequately protected by measures short of the blanket,
full opt-out required if (b)(2) certification were rejected in favor of
(b)(3) certification.
An example of a case fitting into the second category, i.e., a
case that cannot be certified under (b)(2) despite a common,
injunctive set of issues, might be a class analogous to the one
exposed to asbestos in Ortiz,' in which damages at stage II would
be extremely large, and in which there would be wide variability in
class members' interests at stage I given the extreme variability at
stage II. Those class members with already manifested injuries,
for example, have significantly different interests, even at stage I,
than those class members who have not yet manifested injury
because, e.g., the larger and stronger the damages claim, the more

126. 527 U.S. at 861. This example brackets the question of the extent to
which sub-classing (and providing separate counsel) to those groups under
Rule 23(c)(4)(B) would significantly mitigate the cohesivity concern.
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risk averse the class member is likely to be at injunctive stage I.
Examples in the third category, i.e., cases in which stage I can
be certified under (b)(2) but stage II cannot, would be many of the
mixed cases discussed earlier in the Article. For example,
Robinson, Allison, and Coleman were likely best structured in this
manner. Common issues going to the defendant's liability for its
class-directed conduct, and the need for and scope of injunctive
relief would occur in stage I under (b)(2). It is possible that
individual issues of backpay - historically considered "equitable"
- could also be resolved in the (b)(2) stage of the case, as Allison
itself holds that such claims can be part of a (b)(2) class.
In all likelihood, though, Allison's concession to (b)(2) makes
little sense, and is likely driven by the desire to adhere to the Fifth
Circuit line of cases, prior to the CRA of 1991, in which
employment discrimination cases in their entirety were certified
under (b)(2). In cases such as Allison, though, the scope of
individual issues needed to resolve backpay - e.g., would a class
member have been promoted but for the problematically
amorphous promotion process - vary tremendously among class
members. Allison is incorrect in effectively holding that mixed
employment discrimination cases cannot be certified post-CRA,
but it should be credited for making clear that the universally
accepted pure (b)(2) certification of such cases pre-CRA was likely
untenable (notwithstanding Allison's own unconvincing asides to
the contrary).
So long as one concurs in this proposed structure for assessing
(b)(2) predominance, there is no reason why one must agree with
any particular assessment of where to draw the line in the pure
(b)(2) predominance context in order to concur in the structure and
certification criteria proposed for the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class. One
could agree with Allison that pure (b)(2) classes may never include
any non-incidental damages, and thus believe that the example of
the inmate class seeking minor but non-trivial damages, may not
be certified as a pure (b)(2), instead requiring certification as a
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid. Thus, agreeing with Allison on the scope of a
pure (b)(2) class would not cause one to reject the propriety of the
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid, but rather to believe that the hybrid must
occupy a greater expanse of the spectrum between a pure (b)(2)
and a pure (b)(3) class action. Indeed, this is precisely the analysis
that the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have adopted - a narrow
approach to pure (b)(2) certification, and a welcoming approach to
hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) certification.127
127. See Murray, 244 F.3d at 812-13 (suggesting that it would accept (b)(2)
certification of claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, and remanding for
a determination whether claims to damages could be certified under (b)(3),
thereby implicitly expressing approval for some form of hybrid certification);
Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 898 (expressly stating approval of hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3)
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3. 23(b)(3)Predominance
In order to understand the role of (b)(3) predominance in
certification of a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class action - none at all - it
is necessary to recognize that (b)(2) classes, hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3)
classes, and (b)(3) classes are a nested set. Though the argument
is largely beyond the scope of this Article, understanding this
nesting is necessary to understanding why (b)(3) predominance is
irrelevant to the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid.
Properly understood, pure (b)(2) classes are a subset of those
class actions that could be certified as (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrids, and
hybrid (b)(2)(b)(3) classes are a subset of those class actions that
could be certified entirely under (b)(3). This is because these
2 8
categories of class action are not fundamentally incompatible.
Instead, the narrower, more cohesive categories satisfy all the
requirements of the broader categories. The greater the cohesivity
of the class, the more stages of the case that can be certified under
(b)(2) rather than (b)(3), because a narrower range of notice and
opt-out can be provided while still respecting absent class
members' autonomy rights. Thus, in line with the widely accepted
principle for choosing a (b)(2) rather than a (b)(3) class action if a
class can be certified under either, 29 if a class may be certified
under more than one of the 23(b) categories, including a pure
(b)(2), a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid, and a pure (b)(3), it should be certified
under the category authorizing the narrowest scope of notice and
opt-out.
A (b)(3) class is the broadest category. This is because all
classes certifiable under (b)(3) share the characteristic of having a
predominate core of common issues, with a class action being the
superior method of resolving the dispute. In a (b)(3) class that
cannot be certified as a hybrid or a (b)(2) class, there are
sufficiently varying individual issues so that full notice and optout rights must be provided for every class member as to the
entire case; (b)(3) class members may exercise their autonomy
interest by entirely opting out of the suit if they so desire, because
their interests are not sufficiently congruent to those of the class
as a whole to require them to remain in even the common portions
of the suit.
Parallel to the nested set of class structures is the
corresponding nested set of certification criteria. In particular,
(b)(2) predominance is a subset of (b)(3) predominance. This
certification).
128. But see Mullenix, supra note 11, at 187-88 (arguing that (b)(1) and (b)(2)
classes are necessarily cohesive, and thus are fundamentally conceptually
incompatible with (b)(3) classes, which are not).
129. See id. at 217 (noting the traditional rule that if a class can be certified
under multiple provisions of Rule 23(b), the court should certify under the
provision providing the narrowest scope of notice and opt-out rights).
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means that when a particular proposed class structure satisfies
(b)(2) predominance (for stage I or for both stages), the proposed
class structure necessarily also satisfies (b)(3) predominance. This
is because predominance under both (b)(2) and (b)(3) requires (1)
the presence of a critical mass of common issues the resolution of
which are sufficient to materially advance the case as a whole, and
thus warrant collective resolution, and (2) the absence of a critical
mass of individual issues that would preclude collective resolution
of the particular proposed class structure.
As to both of these prongs, (b)(2) predominance requires
everything that (b)(3) predominance requires, plus somewhat
more. As to the presence of a critical mass of common issues,
(b)(2) predominance mandates the additional requirement that
those common issues be in the form of a claim for class-wide
injunctive relief. As to the absence of a critical mass of individual
issues sufficient to preclude the proposed scope of notice and optout rights as unduly intrusive on autonomy rights, (b)(2)
predominance assesses the viability of narrower autonomy rights
than in a (b)(3) class.
Thus (b)(2) predominance requires everything (b)(3)
predominance requires, and somewhat more. For a (b)(2)/(b)(3)
hybrid, the (b)(2) predominance criterion requires a finding that
(1) resolution of common issues would materially advance
resolution of the entire suit, and that (2) individual issues are not
so significant as to require full notice and opt-out rights for stage I
of the suit. Predominance under (b)(3) would require finding only
that (1) resolution of common issues would materially advance
resolution of the entire suit, and would be satisfied even if (2)
individual issues were so significant that full notice and opt-out
were required for stage I of the suit. Therefore, any set of
individual issues that would permit certification of a hybrid class
with opt-out rights limited to stage II could not possibly preclude
certification of a (b)(3) class with full opt-out rights as to the entire
case.
Because the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class requires satisfaction of
(b)(2) predominance, it does not evade scrutiny for (b)(3)
predominance; it is, however, redundant to apply a distinct (b)(3)
predominance test to a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class that has already
been determined to satisfy (b)(2) predominance (as to stage I, or as
to the entire case). This is where Allison most fundamentally errs,
in that its three-paragraph rejection of a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid
appears to turn on a rejection of (b)(3) predominance - a criterion
that is simply not independently applicable to a potential
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid13 that has satisfied (b)(2) predominance as to
stage I of the case. 1
130. Several courts of appeals, including the Fifth Circuit, apply a (b)(3)
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4. 23(b)(3) Superiority
Assuming that the (b)(2) text and the (b)(2) predominance
tests have been satisfied for stage I (and not for stage II), that
means that the common, injunctive portion of the suit should be
certified under (b)(2). A final piece of the hybrid (b)(2)I(b)(3)
certification analysis remains: should the individual issues going
to damages be certified under (b)(3) (thereby certifying a
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid suit), or should those individual issues be
severed from the suit (thereby certifying a partial (b)(2) class
action)? This determination is made pursuant to the criterion of
piece of the analysis for certifying a
(b)(3) superiority, the final
3
hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) suit. '
The (b)(3) superiority criterion does not apply independently
to the (b)(2) component of the suit, the superiority of which is
taken as a given based on the language and logic of Rule 23. The
(b)(2) portion of the suit does not require a superiority
determination under Rule 23 because the drafters of the Rule
quite reasonably believed that any class (or portion thereof)
certifiable under (b)(2) would necessarily be a superior manner of
resolving the dispute, given the natural cohesivity among (b)(2)
class members. The (b)(3) superiority criterion looks, then, to
stage II of the case - the individual claims for monetary relief
that cannot be certified under (b)(2). The two options to assess in
determining superiority are either to certify a stage II under (b)(3),
and thus to certify a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class action, or not to
II at all, leaving stage I as a partial (b)(2) class
certify 13stage
2
action.
predominance test that I have argued elsewhere is analytically incorrect and
unduly narrow. Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominantand Superior to
None: Class Certification of ParticularIssues Under 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L.
REV. 249, 276 n.108 (2002). Even if one disagrees with my assessment of
(b)(3) predominance, however, this is not fatal to the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class;
it merely makes the theory less elegant, and even more useful, in that cases
could be certified under a hybrid (b)(2)I(b)(3) structure that could not be
certified under a pure (b)(3) class. While I disagree, this is not incoherent, and
indeed it is precisely the approach of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits,

which follow the Fifth Circuit on pure (b)(2) and pure (b)(3) predominance, but
expressly (albeit in dicta) approve of the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid.
131. The matters pertinent to the findings of both predominance and
superiority include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
132. In a partial (b)(2) class, any absent class members seeking damages
would need to file a subsequent suit (with issue preclusion from the partial
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This (b)(3) superiority determination turns largely on
manageability (as is typical for (b)(3) superiority). If the court
determines that it is able to resolve the varying individual issues
of stage II within the scope of a single suit in a fair and efficient
manner, (b)(3) superiority is satisfied, and the case should proceed
as a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class action. If, instead, the court finds
that it is unable to manage resolution of the individual issues in
an effective manner, then it should not certify stage II under
(b)(3), and a partial (b)(2) class will be superior."'
There is some disagreement among courts and commentators
over the role that manageability concerns should play in the (b)(3)
superiority determination. The stronger position seems to be that
certification should rarely be denied on the basis that a class (or
portion thereof) is unmanageable, because the proper criterion is
not whether management of the class will be difficult, but rather
whether it would be less difficult than if every class member were
to bring an individual suit for damages - a position that, perhaps
surprisingly, Richard Posner shares.
In any event, once again it
is not necessary to take any particular position on where to draw
the line on (b)(3) superiority and manageability in order to concur
in the structure of the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid, and the role of (b)(3)
superiority in the certification determination.
B. Notice and Opt-Out in a Hybrid ClassAction
As explained above, (b)(2) text, (b)(2) predominance, and (b)(3)
superiority criteria comprise the requirements for certifying a
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid. These criteria leave open important issues
concerning the implementation of such a suit. Most notably, there

(b)(2) class action applying in favor of either the plaintiff class or defendants).
133. An example of the relatively rare case in which a partial (b)(2) might
well be superior to a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid is the enormous class action in Dukes
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004). There, the size of
the class and the variability of the factual circumstances across the country
might suggest that liability to the class and injunctive relief be resolved
collectively at stage I, but that damages be determined in, e.g., statewide (or
store-wide) (b)(3) classes in separate suits.
134. Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 660-61 (7th Cir. 2004).
The court stated:
[A]lthough the district judge might have said more about manageability,
the defendants have said nothing against it except that there are
millions of class members. That is no argument at all. The more
claimants there are, the more likely a class action is to yield substantial
economies in litigation ....
The realistic alternative to a class action is
not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30. But a class action has to be unwieldy
indeed before it can be pronounced an inferior alternative - no matter
how massive the fraud or other wrongdoing that will go unpunished if
class treatment is denied - to no litigation at all.
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are unresolved issues concerning the proper scope of notice and
opt-out for the portions of the suit certified under Rule 23(b)(2)."'
The most serious potential criticism of the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid is
that restricting the scope of notice and opt-out in stage I of a
hybrid is an undue intrusion into the autonomy interests of absent
class members, at least those with substantial damages claims.
Thus it is vital to explore the extent to which the district court in
fact has the power to protect absent class members' autonomy
interests in the (b)(2) portion of a hybrid suit, shy of the full notice
and opt-out rights provided under (b)(3).
The district court retains tremendous flexibility under Rule
23(d) to enter orders that are highly protective of absent class
members' autonomy interests, shy of complete opt-out. These
methods include granting class members the right to intervene in
the case, perhaps representing a distinct sub-class.136 The district
courts are similarly (perhaps equivalently) authorized to permit
absent class members, even though they are required to remain
within the lawsuit, to appear represented by separate counsel of
their own choosing, more along the lines of mandatory aggregation
than mandatory class membership. 37'
The district court may thus provide significant autonomy to
class members who have a legitimate basis for seeking to control
litigation of their individual issues going to damages. Although
these class members are required to remain in a forum they might
rather avoid, this sort of restriction does not generally present an
insurmountable burden under Rule 23 or Due Process (at least if
there is personal jurisdiction, or the class member is not seeking
substantial damages), given judicial approval of mechanisms such
as Multi-District Litigation. Multi-District Litigation allows cases
with common issues, including class actions, to be transferred and

135. In stage II - the remedial, (b)(3) stage of a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class
action, in which individual issues vary and damages may be awarded absent class members have the full set of rights to notice and opt-out under
23(c)(2) as they would in a case brought entirely under Rule 23(b)(3). "If a
Rule 23(b)(3) class is certified in conjunction with a (b)(2) class, the (c)(2)(B)
notice requirements must be satisfied as to the (b)(3) class." FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(2) advisory committee's note (2003).
136. See Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62
IND. L.J. 507, 524 (1987) (discussing a party's intervention in order to recover
for individual damages); see also Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 91 (upholding the
district court's decision to allow an absent class member to intervene and be
the sole representative of a sub-class, and to deny that class member the right
to opt out of a (b)(2) settlement class).
137. See 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 25, § 4.1 (citing FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)) (stating that "alternatively, absent class members have the right to
enter their appearance through counsel"); Sherman, supra note 136, at 557
(discussing opt-outs and concurrent trials); Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1154 (citing
Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1220 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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despite the wishes of
consolidated for pre-trial proceedings,
138
litigants who would rather stay put.
Even beyond permitting class members to appear in the (b)(2)
portions of the suit represented by separate counsel, the district
court has other means by which to protect absent class members'
autonomy interests shy of full opt-out. As the Seventh Circuit has
recognized, in the settlement context this will often include
presenting all class members (even members of a (b)(2) class) with
notice of the proposed settlement, and providing a full right to
participate in the Rule 23(e) fairness hearing that determines
whether the settlement will be approved, and granting an
The D.C.
opportunity to object to the terms of settlement.19
Circuit has similarly recognized that granting such rights to
members of a (b)(2) class provides significant protection of their
autonomy interests, even when those class members are not
permitted to opt out of a (b)(2) settlement resolving claims for nonThe district court's power to grant
trivial damages. 4"
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 establishes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation to improve the management of justice in federal trial courts. Note,
The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1001, 1001-02 (1974). Under § 1407, the Judicial Panel may temporarily
transfer civil actions with common questions of fact, pending in different
district courts, to a single court for consolidated pretrial procedures. Id. at
1001. Although the Supreme Court has held that § 1407 does not authorize
the transferee court to retain the cases for trial, that is a matter of statutory
interpretation, rather than Due Process imperative. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 33-43 (1998)
139. Williams v. Burlington N., Inc., 832 F.2d 100, 103 (7th Cir. 1987).
Williams held that the district court had adequately exercised its power to
protect absent class members' autonomy interests because it
gave all class members the opportunity to voice any objections to the
proposed settlement. Further, he appointed a special master to deal
with any objections to the settlement proposal. Finally, he held a final
fairness hearing before he approved the consent decree.... From a
practical standpoint, the opportunities to object in this case were
tantamount to the protections envisioned by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
The district court employed measures that provided adequate protection
from any potentially antagonistic interest between class members.
Id.
140. As the D.C. Circuit explained in Eubanks:
We note that the district court afforded all class members substantial
procedural protections. The settlement agreement provided that prior
to its final approval, individual notice of the proposed settlement would
be mailed to all potential class members of which the Library was aware
or who could reasonably be identified. In addition, notice would be
published in area newspapers and publications of the Library of
Congress. Individuals who submitted claim forms received follow-up
notices, advising them of the Settlement Committee's determination of
the relief they were entitled to receive, and that they could contest any
aspect of the award at a "fairness hearing" before the district court prior
to the court's final approval of the settlement agreement.... Although
the procedural protections they received may not have been precisely
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discretionary notice for stage I of a hybrid can also, in appropriate
circumstances, protect class members' autonomy to a significant
extent, even if the scope of notice is somewhat less than would be
mandated under Eisen for a (b)(3) class.
Several commentators have suggested still other ways in
which some form of limited or partial opt-out rights could be
granted to absent class members. These opt-out rights, though
subject to certain conditions intended to further fairness and
efficiency, would be sufficient to protect class members' autonomy
rights, but would be less broad than the absolute opt-out right
currently required under (b)(3).1" Whatever one's take on any of
these specific proposals, the fundamental point is this: the
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid structure can be quite protective of class
members' autonomy interests, even at stage I, if circumstances so
warrant. It is the rare mixed case in which interests diverge so
materially at stage II that the very broad autonomy protections
available in stage I of a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class are insufficient.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS

Even assuming the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class action as
described above is fully consistent with the mandates of, and
policies underlying, Rule 23, the next question is whether the

equivalent to the rights accorded to (b)(3) class members, appellants
point to nothing that would indicate that they did not have a meaningful
opportunity to present the merits of their individual claims.
Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 97 n.15 (citing Williams, 832 F.2d at 104).
141. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 913, 958 (1998) ("In (b)(1) or (b)(2) cases, conditional or
limited opt out rights may also make sense in the context of a negotiated or
litigated outcome. . . ."); Sherman, supra note 136, at 553 (discussing "the
desirability of shaping hybrid forms of opt-out rights which do not necessarily
conform to a rigid distinction between mandatory and nonmandatory class
actions"). Sherman further contends:
It is true that such proposals have been unsuccessful thus far.... [But
this does not undermine the] attractiveness of hybrid opt-out rights and
raise[s] the question whether opt-out rights need necessarily be all or
nothing. There would seem to be nothing in the definition of the three
Rule 23(b) classes to prevent the attachment of hybrid opt-out
conditions; indeed those definitions make no reference to the manner in
which the duplicative litigation problem will be handled.
Id.; Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy
Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231, 258-61 (1991) (discussing "a number of 'hybrid optout rights' which could be devised to balance individual protection with group
needs, depending on the particular situation"); see also Eubanks, 110 F.3d at
96 n.15 (asserting that although the appellants of a (b)(2) class were not given
rights equivalent to that of a (b)(3) class, they were still afforded an adequate
opportunity to present the merits of their particular claim); cf Bone, supra
note 36, at 108-11 (proposing a revised Rule 23 that would provide the courts
with guidance with respect to class actions, but also allow modifications
dependent on the specific facts of each case).
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hybrid class passes constitutional muster. Courts have expressed
concerns about hybrid classes under both the Due Process Clause
and the Seventh Amendment. Though some forms of hybrid class
actions might violate the Constitution, careful implementation of
the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class proposed above, and as further
described below, ensures constitutional compliance.
A. Due Process
Due Process concerns may arise in mixed cases when absent
class members' autonomy interest in controlling their right to
recover damages is unduly hampered because they are confined to
a mandatory class with no opt-out right. The Supreme Court has
left unresolved (a) whether Rule 23 permits certification of a class
seeking monetary damages other than under 23(b)(3), and (b) if so,
whether the absence of opt-out rights would accord with Due
Process.142
These concerns are squarely presented in mixed cases
certified entirely under Rule 23(b)(2) without any right to opt out.
Thus, it may be that those courts of appeals such as the D.C.
Circuit that have approved settlement of pure (b)(2) cases
awarding damages without granting class members the right to
opt out stand on shaky constitutional footing.' Whether that is so
or not, the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class action satisfies Due Process,
even assuming the narrowest plausible resolution of the issues left
open by the Supreme Court: that damages claims must be certified
under 23(b)(3), and that Due Process requires opt-out for all
classes seeking damages. This is because the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3)
class effectively sidesteps Due Process concerns by granting full
notice and opt-out rights under 23(b)(3) at stage II, when class
members' individual interests in damages are in fact at issue.
Courts and commentators have almost universally recognized
that the hybrid opt-out structure comports with Due Process.'"
142. See, e.g., Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815; Ticor, 511 U.S. 117; Adams v. Robertson,
520 U.S. 83 (1997); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 &
n.3 (1985).
143. Though beyond the scope of this Article, it would seem that neither
Rule 23 nor Due Process would require full opt-out rights under (b)(3) for
every class seeking damages. At a minimum, opt-out should not be required
in a negative value suit - i.e., for claims that as a practical matter owe their
existence to the viability of the class form.
144. It is of course possible to conceive of a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class with
such divergent interests that the inability to opt out of even stage I would
violate Due Process. But those are precisely the cases that could not be
properly certified as (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrids because they would fail the (b)(2)
predominance criterion. In other words, the certification criteria for a
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid are at least as protective of autonomy as is the Due Process
Clause. But see Richard A. Epstein, ClassActions: Aggregation,Amplification,
and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 510 (2003) (suggesting that there
are due process concerns for absent class members in hybrid cases seeking
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George Rutherglen has argued that when a court engages in
"certification of claims for class-wide injunctive and declaratory
relief under subdivision (b)(2) and certification of claims for
individual compensatory relief under subdivision (b)(3) ... the
court.., avoid[s] the constitutional question whether individual
notice is required by the due process clause."145 Although it may be
overstating it a bit to suggest that the due process question may be
entirely avoided by a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class, the answer to that
question is clear: due process does not stand in the way of the
hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class.
Similarly, Samuel Issacharoff explains:
What remain unexplored [by the Supreme Court] are those cases in
which there are elements that raise collective injunctive claims for
relief and potential individual damages claims by absent class
members.

The logic of Shutts would indicate that in such cases a

due process right to opt out is a prerequisite for a binding judgment
146
as to the damages claims, but not as to the injunctive component.
In other words, the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class is structured
precisely so as to satisfy
Due Process, as numerous courts of
147
appeals have so held.
Even the courts of appeals with the narrowest approach and
the greatest concern for Due Process would find the (b)(2)/(b)(3)
hybrid to be constitutional. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Brown
v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,"' which surfaced the Due Process
concerns that the Supreme Court noted but did not resolve in
Ticor, found no Due Process violation in binding class members to
the injunctive portion of a mixed case certified and settled without
any opt-out rights, though it found a Due Process violation in
failing to provide opt-out as to damages.'
This holding logically
significant monetary damages, because "the denial of any opt-out (at least
until the damage phase) would deny individual plaintiffs control over a suit in
which they have very large stakes").
145. Rutherglen, supra note 63, at 32-33.
146. Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out
of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1066 (2002). See also id. ("The
effect of focusing on the preclusive nature of the judgment is to disaggregate
the two components of the case and to allow a binding judgment on some
claims, but not others.").
147. See Grimes v. Vitalink Commc'ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1560 & n.8 (3d
Cir. 1994) (concluding that the "due process protections as articulated in
Shutts are sufficient to bind absent class members who had sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum"); In re E.& S. Dist. Joint Asbestos Litig., 78
F.3d 764, 778 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussing the due process holding articulated in
Shutts).
148. Brown, 982 F.2d 386.
149. See id. at 392 ("Because Brown had no opportunity to opt out of the...
litigation, we hold there would be a violation of minimal due process if Brown's
damage claims were held barred by resjudicata."). The court further held that
"Brown will be bound by the injunctive relief provided by the settlement...,
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entails the constitutionality of the hybrid class structure, with no
Due Process impediment to a mandatory stage I, notwithstanding
downstream damages.
The Seventh and D.C. Circuits have gone the furthest in
finding that Due Process presents no obstacle to certifying mixed
cases without any opt-out rights, so long as adequate
representation is provided. Both courts explicitly endorse the
propriety of the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid class action. The Seventh
Circuit held:
[t]he district court could certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class for the portion
of the case addressing equitable relief and a Rule 23(b)(3) class for
the portion of the case addressing damages. This avoids the due
process problems of certifying the entire case under Rule 23(b)(2) by
introducing the Rule 23(b)(3) protections of personal notice and
opportunity to opt out for the damages claims.15°
Indeed, pre-CRA, the Seventh Circuit went so far as to hold
that Due Process was satisfied in an employment discrimination
action seeking monetary relief certified without opt-out rights
because the district court provided notice and provided "all class
members the opportunity to voice any objections to the proposed
settlement..., appointed a special master to deal with any
objections to the settlement proposal, [and] held a final fairness
hearing before he approved the consent decree." 5'
These
protections, asserted the court, "provided the appellant with the
equivalent due process protection that would be accorded to a Rule
23(b)(3) class member."' The D.C. Circuit similarly held that Due
Process permits a non-opt-out suit certified and settled entirely
under (b)(2), notwithstanding the existence of substantial
damages."'
and foreclosed from seeking other or further injunctive relief in this case, but
resjudicatawill not bar Brown's claims for monetary damages against Ticor."
150. Lemon, 216 F.3d at 581.
151. Williams, 832 F.2d at 104.
152. Id. Williams plainly goes too far in saying that the safeguard of being
able to object to settlement in the damages stage of a pure (b)(2) class action is
the functional equivalent of the safeguards available under a (b)(2)/(b)(3)
hybrid; they are simply not equivalent. The safeguards for absent class
members' autonomy interests are far greater in a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid, easily
surpassing any Due Process requirements, whatever one's position is as to the
constitutionality of mandatory, non-opt-out (b)(2) classes seeking damages.
The statement nonetheless helps demonstrate that the far less intrusive
hybrid structure is well within Constitutional bounds.
153. See Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 97 n.15 (holding that due process is satisfied
in the (b)(2) context by less than full notice and opt-out rights, even when
monetary damages are sought).
Although the magistrate judge never conducted individualized hearings,
Shaw had an opportunity to file an individual claim with the Settlement
Committee, and to challenge the Committee's determination at the
fairness hearing before the district court. In due process terms, this
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In sum, there is a split of authority between courts holding
that Due Process requires opt-out at stage II of a mixed case - as
provided in a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class - and those that do not find
it necessary. Both sides of the divide find no Due Process problem
at all with hybrid certification."' The propriety of the (b)(2)/(b)(3)
hybrid, not only under the Constitution, but as a policy matter, is
thus highlighted by the fact that it is so plainly up to the task of
protecting class members' autonomy interests, while providing
virtually all of the benefits of the more autonomy-constraining
non-opt-out approach.
B. The Seventh Amendment
The Seventh Amendment presents two further potential
constitutional hurdles to a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class action. The
Reexamination Clause dictates that "no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law," and the Trial by Jury
Clause guarantees the right to a jury "in Suits at common law."'55
First, and more simply, the Reexamination Clause does not
preclude a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class action (or, more broadly, any
bifurcated class action) even when different juries may hear
overlapping evidence at different stages of the litigation, so long as
no issues - i.e., specific factual determinations - are reexamined
by a subsequent jury."
In a multi-stage class action, the
Reexamination Clause concern can be avoided entirely if a single
jury resolves each of the stages of the case."7 Even if separate
juries are employed for separate stages of the case (or even if

procedure was equivalent to the 'individualized hearings' that the court
had previously contemplated.
Id. at 97-98.
154. The petition for certiorari in Crystian v. Tower Loan of Mississippi, Inc.,
125 S. Ct. 972 (2005), raised many concerns with a mandatory class precluding
opt-out from a settlement resolving substantial claims for damages; however,
petitioners stated that they would not object if the non-opt-out portion of the
case had been limited to common issues going to injunctive relief.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Amendment also prohibits bifurcation of
issues when doing so would cause "confusion and uncertainty." Gasoline
Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931).
156. See, e.g., Romberg, supra note 130, at 323-26 (stating that only those
cases that fail Rule 23's superiority test violate the Seventh Amendment, and
therefore the Seventh Amendment imposes no greater a hurdle than Rule
23(b)(3) itself); Wolf, supra note 30, at 1868, 1877-78 (stating that under the
Reexamination Clause, the same jury is not required to hear every stage of

litigation).
157. Although the Seventh Amendment concern is gone, this may present a
potential issue of manageability, relevant under the (b)(3) superiority
determination, if the same jury must sit for too long to function adequately.
However, this fear seems to be greatly exaggerated, as juries (and certainly

grand juries) regularly sit (capably, if imperfectly) for long periods of time.
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multiple juries are required for subsets of class members at stage
II), it is not difficult to avoid a Reexamination Clause problem, so
long as the court is careful. Allison, the case suggesting the
greatest Seventh Amendment concerns, acknowledges that:
[tihe existence of common factual issues is to be distinguished from
the existence of overlapping evidence. For purposes of the Seventh
Amendment, the question is whether factual issues overlap, thus
requiring one trier-of-fact to decide a disputed issue that must be
decided by a subsequent jury, not whether the two fact-finders will
merely have to consider similar evidence in deciding distinct
issues. 1
Thus, as the Second Circuit explained in Robinson, any
Reexamination Clause problem can be avoided by carefully crafted
questions directed to the first jury, and careful instructions to the
second jury that they are bound by the factual findings of the first
jury:
Trying a bifurcated claim before separate juries does not run afoul of
the Seventh Amendment, [even though] a "given [factual] issue may
not be tried by different, successive juries.. . ." [Alvoiding this calls
for sound case management, not [outright] avoidance of the
procedure.... First, the court needs to carefully define the roles of
the two juries so that the first jury does not decide issues within the
prerogative of the second jury. Second, the court must carefully
craft the verdict form for the first jury so that the second jury knows
what has been decided already. If the first jury makes sufficiently
detailed findings, those findings are then akin to instructions for the
second jury to follow. 59
The district court must take care in structuring a (b)(2)/(b)(3)
hybrid, for this and other reasons, but this is no reason not to
employ the device.
The more serious Seventh Amendment question concerns the
Trial by Jury Clause. The Fifth Circuit, in Allison, suggested that

158. Allison, 151 F.3d at 423 n.21.
159. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 169 n.13 (citing Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252,
268 (2d Cir. 1999)). See also Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75
WASH. L. REV. 705, 736-37 (2000) (asserting that federal courts can avoid the
risk of re-examination by taking two precautions); Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort
Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 499, 542 (1998) (arguing that the Reexamination Clause does not forbid
the separate trial of overlapping issues, but merely requires that later juries
follow the first jury's formal findings); cf. Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino,
186 F.3d 620, 628 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that '[the Seventh Amendment
does not prohibit bifurcation of trials as long as the judge [does] not divide
issues between separate trials in such a way that the same issue is
reexamined by different juries," and thus upholding a purely (b)(3) class in
which common issues would be resolved first, and issues individual to class
members would be resolved by a different jury in a subsequent stage of the
case) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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the Trial by Jury Clause would likely pose a barrier to resolving
equitable relief prior to resolving damages in a mixed case (at least
in the post-1991 CRA employment discrimination context), thus
suggesting a potentially insurmountable hurdle to certification of
a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid. In order to understand why the hurdle is
entirely surmountable - and why no court of appeals other than
the Allison court has found the Trial by Jury Clause to preclude a
(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid - it is necessary to understand the specific
question before the Allison court (at least as that court perceived
it).
Allison arrived at its Seventh Amendment conclusion by
considering whether plaintiffs' claim of disparate impact (which
authorizes back pay, but not compensatory monetary damages,
and thus does not require a jury) could be litigated in a bench trial
under Rule 23(b)(2), with the district court reserving the question
of whether the disparate treatment pattern-or-practice claim
(which does authorize compensatory and punitive damages, thus
requiring a jury) could potentially be certified for subsequent
resolution under Rule 23(b)(3). 16' Allison held that the Seventh
Amendment precluded first litigating the equitable claims under
(b)(2) in a bench trial, with potential subsequent jury resolution of
the legal claims under (b)(3). 6'
The Robinson court explained:
[O]nce the right to a jury trial attaches to a claim, it extends to all
factual issues necessary to resolving that claim. Where a legal and
equitable claim in a suit share a common factual issue, trial of the
equitable claim first to a judge would foreclose the later
presentation of the common issue to a jury, and thereby violate the
trial-by-jury guarantee. 162
This is true, as far as it goes. This requirement, however,
does not stand in the way of hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) certification
because a court that considers a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class in
advance unlike the deferred consideration of stage II
certification of damages claims contemplated in Allison - can
structure the case to avoid trial-by-jury concerns."n The court can
160. Allison, 151 F.3d at 422-25.

161. Id. at 423.
When claims involving both legal and equitable rights are properly
joined in a single case, the Seventh Amendment requires that all factual
issues common to these claims be submitted to a jury for decision on the
legal claims before final court determination of the equitable claims. ...
As a result, each factual issue common to these claims, if any, must be
decided by the jury before the district court considers the merits of the
disparate impact claim and whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any
equitable relief.
Id.
162. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 170.
163. In Allison itself, the Fifth Circuit rejected the specific structure of
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do so by ensuring that any issues common to the equitable and
legal claims are tried to a jury. The Seventh Circuit, for example,
in Jefferson,"6 held that hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) certification does not
violate the Trial by Jury Clause; it merely "require[s] the district
judge to try the damages claims first, to preserve the right to jury
trial, a step that would complicate the management of separate
classes," but would not preclude the suit.165 As the Seventh Circuit
later reaffirmed:
[s] ince the Civil Rights Act of 1991 entitles the parties to a jury trial
on claims of intentional discrimination ... a district court [can]
proceed[] with divided [(b)(2)/(b)(3)] certification [but] must
adjudicate the damages claims first before a jury to preserve the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, even if adjudication of
these claims decides the equitable claims as well.'6

The Second Circuit, in Robinson, adopted precisely the same
analysis, explaining in more detail how a hybrid class can be
structured to avoid Trial by Jury Clause concerns, so long as the
legal claim is resolved first, and thus a jury decides any factual
issues common to the legal and equitable claims." 7 Thus, the
majority of courts have held that Allison's concerns can be avoided
by careful case management resolving legal claims first - an
option artificially precluded by Allison's contemplation of the
district court deferring part of its certification decision till midsuit.

resolving issues common to the equitable and legal claims in an initial bench
trial; it is not apparent why the court of appeals did not consider the propriety
of a properly constructed hybrid class in which all overlapping factual issues
would be resolved by a jury.
164. 195 F.3d 894.
165. Id. at 898 (holding that hybrid certification in this context "means, as a
practical matter, that the damages claims and the Rule 23(b)(3) class would
dominate the litigation-but the damages-first principle holds even when
there is a single class under a single subdivision of Rule 23.") (citing Dairy
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) and Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959)).
166. Lemon, 216 F.3d at 581-82.
167.
Should the Class Plaintiffs prevail at the liability stage of the patternor-practice claim, the court can order class-wide injunctive relief and
proceed to the remedial phase. Trial of the disparate impact claim could
then be put off until the remedial phase is resolved, thus ensuring that
any overlapping factual issues between the two claims will have first
been tried to a jury in accordance with the Seventh Amendment. If,
however, the Class Plaintiffs should prove unsuccessful at the liability
stage with respect to the pattern-or-practice disparate treatment claim,
the district court can proceed with a bench trial of the disparate impact
claim, relying on answers to special interrogatories from the pattern-orpractice jury for any common factual issues.
Robinson, 267 F.3d at 170.
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Second, and more fundamentally, there is a simpler and more
effective way to avoid trial-by-jury concerns without, as the
Seventh and Second Circuits contemplate, resorting to an
awkward trial structure in which the entire set of legal claims is
resolved first in a separate proceeding before a jury. Applying this
simpler and more effective trial structure requires - as with the
reframing conventional
hybrid class action in general understanding, and requires recognizing that cases are not
composed of indivisible causes of action, but rather of numerous
discrete issues that may be elements of more than one cause of
action or claim.
The trial court thus has discretion to structure a hybrid
(b)(2)/(b)(3) class action involving legal and equitable claims in
whatever manner it thinks most wise - including resolving
equitable claims in an initial (b)(2) stage - so long as the court
requires that all disputed factual issues common to both equitable
and legal claims are resolved by a jury. The district court can thus
empanel the jury throughout the case, with the court resolving all
purely equitable issues, and directing the jury, even at stage I, to
resolve all issues common to both the equitable and legal claims.
The court, bound by the jury's factual findings on common issues,
determines whether to enter class-wide injunctive relief.16 Legal
claims can be resolved simultaneously with, or subsequent to,
equitable claims, so long as all factual issues necessary to resolve
those legal claims are resolved by a jury.
Indeed, one commentator has suggested that, as a practical
matter, a similar process will often occur naturally in a mixed
case, even when a court takes the conventional route of directing
that legal issues be resolved first:
[One] approach [to avoiding Trial by Jury concerns] is to try the
legal issues first to a single jury and preserve the equitable issues
for the second phase. One problem with this approach is that
damage issues cannot be resolved without first establishing liability.
Once liability is established, the equitable claims resolve themselves
in most instances. Therefore, the court is merely proposing that
there be one trial with one jury that resolves most of the class-wide
issues. 169
Finally, the Supreme Court decision in Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, a leading Trial by Jury Clause case, provides
significant support for the propriety of the above approach.
168. See id. (describing how the district court may exercise its discretion to
award equitable relief based upon the jury's factual findings).
169. Robert M. Brava-Partain, Note, Due Process, Rule 23, And Hybrid
Classes: A Practical Solution, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1377-78 (2002).
Although Brava-Partain may be somewhat exaggerating the similarity
between the conventional solution and the solution proposed above, his
observation does suggest that there is less of a gap than might be imagined.
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Beacon, considering an anti-trust case involving a mix of issues
going to injunctive and monetary relief, concluded that the district
court could structure the case for resolution in a single suit in
which a jury would resolve all legal issues, and the judge would
enter appropriate injunctive relief based on the jury's factual
findings:
Whatever permanent injunctive relief [the plaintiff might be
entitled to on the basis of the decision in this case could, of course,
be given by the court after the jury renders its verdict. In this way
the issues between these parties could be settled
17 ° in one suit giving
Beacon a full jury trial of every antitrust issue.
In support of this conclusion, Beacon relies on Ring v.
Spina,"' a Second Circuit case that even more strongly supports
the viability of the structure proposed above. In Ring, the court
held:
Plaintiffs timely Uury] demand therefore entitles him to trial by
jury ....And if the court so determines, it will be a simple matter,
under the flexible procedure contemplated by the [Federal] rules [of
Civil Procedure], for the judge presiding at the jury trial to decide
any equitable issues at the same time without delay. 172
Beacon - both on its own, and through its favorable citation
to Ring - thus supports the propriety of structuring a mixed case
for resolution in a single proceeding; the jury decides factual issues
necessary to resolution of the legal claims, and the judge, bound by
those factual determinations, decides equitable issues - "at the
same time without delay.""'3 Thus, although Allison is correct that
a jury must resolve all factual issues implicated by any legal
claim, that need not present any serious impediment to
certification or management of a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class. The
district court may structure a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class largely as it
sees fit, including with equitable claims proceeding first, or
proceeding simultaneously with legal claims, so long as the court
provides for a trial by jury on all issues that are elements of legal
claims, in whatever stage of the case in which those issues first
arise.
V. THEORETICAL OBJECTIONS

Not all commentators, however, agree with this laudatory
assessment of the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid. Most notably, Professor
Mullenix views the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid with alarm. The criticism of
the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid falls into three main categories. First,
170. Beacon, 359 U.S. at 508 (citing Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.
1948)).
171. Ring, 166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1948).
172. Id. at 550.
173. Id.
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commentators argue that proponents of the hybrid class have
repeatedly offered vague generalities, and have off-handedly
suggested multiple possible approaches to hybrid certification,
entirely failing to offer any precise, detailed explanation of what a
hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class is, or how it satisfies the policies
underlying class actions, the actual requirements of Rule 23, and
the Due Process Clause and the Seventh Amendment.'74 Point
taken - but this Article is intended as a corrective.
Mullenix also suggests that the existence of the hybrid class
permits plaintiffs to game the system by presenting the court with
multiple forms of proposed certification. She contends that the
hybrid class allows a kind of shell game in which the class action
pea flits between the (b)(2) and (b)(3) walnut shells at the will of
the nefarious class counsel, thereby evading legitimate attempts at
scrutiny.'
Professor Mullenix goes so far as to suggest that it is
improper for plaintiffs in a mixed case to seek certification under a
pure (b)(2) class, and to request that, if the court rejects pure (b)(2)
certification, it certify a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class. Mullenix argues
that this is improper because
in this scenario, there is no downside risk to the pleader for the
failure to clearly understand or define the true nature of the claims
and remedies. The pleader never has to fish or cut bait. If the court
determines that the class seeks a damage remedy that is not
available under the 23(b)(2) category, the court will "fix" this
problem by concurrently certifying both a 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) action.
This possibility rewards the lazy, imprecise, or overly clever pleader,
allows the plaintiff to have his cake and eat it too,
and puts the
176
court in the role of pleading or redefining the class.
This criticism seems unfounded, as there is no apparent
reason why a plaintiff class may not plead in the alternative. Of
course, plaintiffs should not dump a mixed case into the court's
lap, suggest that it has to be certifiable in some way, maybe
through a pure (b)(2) class or, if not, maybe through some kind of
hybrid, and leave it to the court to sort out the mess. But that is a
matter of poor lawyering, and would seem to have nothing to do
with either the propriety of a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class, or the
propriety of careful pleading in the alternative. Plaintiffs should
174. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 11, at 216 ("The [Seventh Circuit's]
Jefferson decision [195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999)] informs us that it is

perfectly legitimate to create and certify such 'hybrid' 23(b)(2) and (b)(3)
classes."). "However, the Jefferson decision, and its progeny, have provided
little or no guidance concerning the actual implementation of such a hybrid
class action." Id.; see also id. at 181 ("The concept of the 'hybrid' class-once a
distinct analytical category under the original 1938 rule-now describes
various types of proposed class actions, and has assumed many meanings,

depending on the setting.").
175. Id. at 215-16.
176. Id. at 216.
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be able to argue that a particular case warrants certification as a
pure (b)(2) class because it satisfies (b)(2) predominance as to the
entire suit; or, in the alternative, if the court holds that (b)(2)
predominance is satisfied for stage I but that full notice and optout rights must be provided at stage II, then to argue that the
class should be certified as a (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid. 77
Richard Epstein, in a vein somewhat similar to Mullenix,
argues that hybrid class actions are improper because, in order for
the (b)(2) portion of the case to proceed as a manageable class
focused on common issues, the district court must improperly and
unfairly restrain defendants' ability to introduce individual or
anecdotal evidence at stage J.178 Although this is not completely
outside the realm of possibility, the danger is quite minimal. This
is because at the time the certification decision is made, the
district court must determine whether (b)(2) predominance is
satisfied - i.e., whether there is a critical mass of individual
issues, including those that defendant would wish to introduce,
that preclude certification of stage I under (b)(2). The defendant is
free to explain to the court at the time of the certification decision
the individual evidence it must be permitted to introduce, and any
consequences of such evidence for (b)(2) predominance; the court
will then decide whether the certification criteria have been
satisfied.
Even if the trial court makes a mistake and, as the trial plays
out, the trial court recognizes that due process requires that
defendants be permitted to introduce notably more individual
evidence than the court had anticipated, the court must, of course,
allow the defendant to do so, either by allowing the evidence in,
even if it would make the class somewhat unwieldy, or even,
conceivably, decertifying the case if it cannot be maintained
consistent with due process. Thus, Professor Epstein's legitimate
concern is already taken into account by (b)(2) predominance and
the certification decision at the front end, and if the court later
recognizes that its front-end assessment was erroneous, the
problem can be rectified at the back end.
Mullenix further suggests what she believes to be another
potential significant barrier to (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrids: class members

177. Part of Mullenix's criticism of the hybrid is grounded on her apparent
belief that the district court has no discretion to permit opt-out for a (b)(2)
suit, or any portion of a suit certified under (b)(2) - a belief not shared by the
numerous courts of appeals that have held otherwise. See Mullenix, supra
note 11, at 181 & n.19 (reasoning that opt-out is not permitted).
178. See Epstein, supra note 144, at 510-14 (citing Robinson, 267 F.3d at
164-69) (discussing the difficulties and due process concerns surrounding
certified classes when an individual plaintiffs anecdotal evidence is barred to
preserve class cohesiveness).
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may be precluded from bringing future claims for damages if they
have been consigned to a hybrid class. She argues that:
[Tihe Jefferson line of cases has also not considered the claimsplitting, res judicata, or preclusive effects of hybrid class actions
that are certified as combined 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) class actions. It is
entirely possible that claims certified in a Jefferson hybrid 23(b)(2)
class could create a res judicata effect that would not be cured by
claims captured by the 23(b)(3) part of the action. In other words,
the mandatory nature of the 23(b)(2) part of the class could serve as
a bar to the pursuit of future claims, which preclusive effect might
not be ameliorated by the 23(b)(3) presence of an opt-out right.179
Insofar as Mullenix suggests that those who choose to opt out
of the (b)(3) portion of the case might somehow be claim precluded
from seeking damages in a subsequent suit because they did not
resolve their damages claims in the first (hybrid) suit, when they
could have done so, that possibility seems far-fetched. If Due
Process (or even Rule 23) require granting the right to opt-out,
preclusionary law could not rationally make such a right
worthless. Insofar as Mullenix suggests that a class member with
a damages claim might be barred from recovery because the class
might lose at stage I, that is in fact a possibility, as discussed
earlier, but that does not thereby foreclose the viability of hybrid
certification.
There is a somewhat more serious preclusion question if stage
II of a hybrid class action sought (b)(3) certification of some but not
all of absent class members' potential claims for damages;
conceivably, those claims might be barred by claim preclusion from
being raised in a subsequent individual suit. Even in such
circumstances, though, there seems no plausible basis to argue
that absent class members could be precluded from asserting those
claims in subsequent individual cases they might file. Those
claims to damages, by hypothesis, could not in fact have been
recovered by absent class members in the prior hybrid class that
did not encompass those claims. Those claims would thus not be
subject to claim preclusion, which only forecloses relief in a
subsequent suit when such relief was or could have been available
in the prior suit.8 '
The most plausible preclusionary concern would involve
damages claims that theoretically could have been certified in the

179. Mullenix, supra note 11, at 217. See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 737-38 (2005)
(discussing problems that arise when individual class members seek different
kinds of remedies, and the impact of that situation on preclusion).
180. See, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) ("Res judicata
prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were
previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or
determined in the prior proceeding."). (emphasis added).
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(b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid, but that class counsel did not seek to certify in
the course of providing adequate representation to class members
- e.g., counsel feared that seeking to certify relatively variable
claims might undermine the court's willingness to find (b)(2)
predominance. Even as to these claims, the far stronger argument
is that the absent class members did not in fact have the
opportunity to recover such damages in the initial suit, because
they had no right to insist that class counsel seek such damages. 8'
Mullenix next contends that hybrid certification conflicts with
what has heretofore been the generally accepted principle that a
class action certifiable under more than one category of Rule 23(b)
should be certified under the category with the narrowest notice
and opt-out requirements. She argues:
[Tihe Jefferson hybrid also makes no sense in light of the
prevailing-and often quoted hornbook rule-that if a class action is
pleaded under multiple provisions of Rule 23, including the 23(b)(3)
provision, then the preference is to certify the class under the
23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) provision. What the Jefferson court seems to be
signaling is, if the plaintiff pleads his case under multiple provisions
provisions, then the
of Rule 23, including the 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3)
182
court can and should certify under them all.
First, Mullenix herself
This criticism misses the mark.
actually believes that "[alpart from expressing a judicial
preference for mandatory classes, these boilerplate rules make
little sense."" It is thus not clear why she would require that a
hybrid class be reconciled with a principle that she believes to be
unwarranted, even though the principle is widely accepted.
Second, and more fundamentally, the principle is in fact both
entirely warranted and entirely consistent with the hybrid
(b)(2)/(b)(3) class action. The principle counsels that, when a case
may be certified under more than one 23(b) category, it should be
certified under the category providing the narrowest notice and
opt-out rights. This is because, by definition, if the case may be
certified under a particular 23(b) category, it is sufficiently
cohesive for the scope of notice and opt-out provided under that
category to adequately protect the autonomy rights of absent class
members. Thus, if a case may be certified under more than one
23(b) category, the court should (at least in the absence of unusual
circumstances dictating otherwise) select the narrowest 23(b)
category available, because doing so will result in the greatest
efficiency, without unduly compromising autonomy.
181. The named representatives might well be precluded from seeking
damages in a subsequent suit - but that would be entirely proper, as class
counsel should seek to recover all such damages for the named representatives
in individual proceedings following the class portions of the suit.
182. Mullenix, supra note 11, at 217.
183. Id. at 187.
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This eminently sensible and widely accepted principle needs
to be refined only slightly to apply in a world in which hybrid
(b)(2)I(b)(3) certification is permissible. The relevant categories
under Rule 23(b) now include not only (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes, but,
in ascending order of notice and opt-out rights, the nested set of
pure (b)(2) classes, hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) classes, and pure (b)(3)
classes. Plaintiffs can and should be permitted to argue that
certification is appropriate under any or all of these categories,
and to assert a fallback position of certification under another
category or categories requiring greater notice and opt-out. It is
only by refusing to consider a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class to be a
category under Rule 23(b) that there is any tension with the
widely accepted principle that Mullenix recognizes, but rejects.
Finally, Mullenix's most fundamental criticism is more
theoretical, and is at the heart of the question of the wisdom and
viability of the (b)(2)/(b)(3) hybrid. Mullenix objects to what she
believes to be discrete - and incompatible - categories of class
action.'
Her objection flows from the notion that a (b)(2) class is
fundamentally cohesive, whereas a (b)(3) class is not: (b)(2) and
(b)(3) classes are just different - while one may in fact be able to
compare apples and oranges, one cannot hybridize such disparate
forms.
Indeed, the title of Mullenix's Article complains of the
"blurring of categorical imperatives" - presumably, the ethical
imperative that (b)(2) is (b)(2) and (b)(3) is (b)(3) and never the
twain shall meet. She argues:
Courts have failed to recognize that mandatory... (b)(2) classes are
conceptually different than the 23(b)(3) class, in that the former are
intended to embrace homogeneous classes, while the latter is not.
Hence, it is difficult to understand how courts can blithely announce
that a class that satisfies the Rule 23(b)(3) criteria may
simultaneously satisfy the mandatory [(b)(2)] class criteria, and
prefer certification under the mandatory provisions.u8
As explained in Part III.A.3., however, a class satisfying the
criteria for a mandatory (b)(2) class simultaneously satisfies the
(b)(3) criteria because the (b)(2) class is a subset of the (b)(3) class.
The resolution to Mullenix's suggested conundrum is the insight
184. See, e.g., id. at 181 ("[Tlhe courts' doctrinal incoherence has blurred the
categorical distinctions among class categories that the Advisory Committee
carefully promulgated in 1966. "Therefore the entire class action rule has
been rendered analytically incoherent. It has become increasingly difficult to
distinguish among the 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) class categories in any
meaningful way." Id. Cf Richard A. Nagareda, The PreexistencePrincipleand
the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 235-41 (2003)

(arguing, based on the "preexistence principle," that mandatory classes under
(b)(2) should not encompass claims to damages, notwithstanding contrary
language in the advisory committee notes).
185. Mullenix, supra note 11, at 187-88.
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that just because (b)(3) classes need not be homogenous, nothing
Properly conceived, the form of
prevents them from being so.
hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class proposed in this Article responds to all of
the critics' concerns, occupying a measured, intermediate position
in the range of options available to a district court deciding if and
how it is to certify a mixed case.
CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to provide a practically and
87
ethically defensible groundwork for the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class.'
The increasing practical necessity of resolving mixed cases
presenting both significant equitable and legal issues has resulted
in a recent groundswell of support for some form of hybrid class
There is general agreement that mixed cases fall
action.
somewhere between pure (b)(2) and pure (b)(3) classes, and that
some kind of hybrid approach to the dual elements of a mixed case
will somehow fairly and efficiently address both the common,
injunctive aspects and the individual, monetary aspects of these
cases.
The problem, as critics have aptly recognized, is that no court
or commentator has provided a coherent justification and
explication for a particular, crystallized form of hybrid class that is
fully protective of the fairness and efficiency interests of
defendants, of absent class members, and of society in general.
This Article is intended as a corrective, setting forth the
theoretical justification for the hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class, explaining
the precise structure such a class should employ, and detailing the
certification requirements that ensure such a class complies with
the logic and dictates of Rule 23 and the Constitution.

186. Consider a loose but potentially helpful analogy: a ((b)(3)-like) group of
good athletes, and a (more homogenous, (b)(2)-like) group of good basketball
players. The group of good basketball players is (loosely) composed of good
athletes who are also tall. Thus, the more homogenous basketball player
group also satisfies the criteria of the less cohesive good athlete group; even
though one group is homogenous and the other is not, that does not prevent
the homogenous group from being a subset of the more heterogeneous one.
187. Compare IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW: KANT'S GROUNDWORK OF
THE METAPHYSIC OF MoRALS 22-23 (H.J. Paton trans., Hutchinson & Co.
1964) (1948) (discussing the ethical notion of the categorical imperative) with
Mullenix, supra note 11, at 215 (discussing how a hybrid (b)(2)/(b)(3) class will
encourage "gaming the system" that will reward "lazy, imprecise, or overly
clever pleaders").

